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This Article explores the conflicting commands of modern constitutional
avoidance (courts must construe ambiguous statutes not only to adopt a
constitutional construction but to avoid constructions that raise constitutional
questions) and Chevron deference (courts must defer to an agency's reasonable
interpretation of an ambiguous statute it administers). While courts and
commentators have suggested that constitutional avoidance trumps Chevron
deference (at either step one or two), this Article advocates that modern
constitutional avoidance should play no role in the review of administrative
interpretations of law. Once Congress has empowered an agency to interpret
an ambiguous statutory provision, a court cannot simply invalidate the
agency's interpretation and replace it with one the court believes better avoids
constitutional questions.
Instead, if an agency's reasonable interpretation raises constitutional
questions, a court must determine whether the interpretation is indeed
unconstitutional and thus an impermissible interpretation at Chevron step two.
This approach, in essence, constitutes a return to the classical doctrine of
constitutional avoidance, and it finds support in the Supreme Court's decision
in National Cable & Telecommunications Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Services. As the
Article illustrates in a variety of administrative contexts, this Brand X doctrine
of constitutional avoidance balances the comparative strengths of courts and
agencies and is necessary to preserve a proper separation of powers between
the courts, the Executive, and Congress. It is also justified under Dean
Edward Rubin's network theory of administrative law.
INTRODUCTION
If a statute is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, the
(modern) doctrine of constitutional avoidance commands courts to construe
the statute to avoid an interpretation that raises serious constitutional
problems.' This canon of statutory construction has its share of advocates
1. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 239 (1999) ("[W]here a statute is
susceptible of two constructions, by one of which grave and doubtful constitutional questions
arise and by the other of which such questions are avoided, [a court's] duty is to adopt the
latter." (quoting United States ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Del. & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366,
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as well as opponents. Advocates underscore that, in addition to advancing
the Judiciary's prudential interest in not reaching difficult constitutional
questions, the doctrine helps maintain a proper separation of powers
between the Judiciary and Congress, owing proper deference to legislative
supremacy.2 As the Supreme Court has noted, "the doctrine serve[s the]
basic democratic function of maintaining a set of statutes that reflect, rather
than distort, the policy choices that elected representatives have made." 3
Constitutional avoidance thus reinforces the notion that each branch of
government has a duty to uphold the Constitution, with the assumption
that Congress intends to pass constitutional laws.
Critics, by contrast, emphasize that the doctrine, in practice, disserves
both of these objectives. 4 First, the doctrine often allows courts to substitute
their own interpretation for one that Congress more likely intended; it thus
displaces legislative supremacy and limits Congress's ability to legislate near
the constitutional limit.5 Second, by holding that an interpretation raises
certain constitutional doubts, a court has not really avoided the
constitutional question but, instead, answered it indirectly, or at least
tentatively, 6 with "a whisper rather than with a shout."7  Much like a
408 (1909))); EdwardJ. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council,
485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) ("[W]here an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would
raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such
problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress." (citing
NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 499-501, 504 (1979))).
2. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 348 (2000); Philip P. Frickey, Interpretation on the Borderline: Constitution,
Canons, Direct Democracy, 1996 N.Y.U. ANN. SURv. AM. L. 477, 512-17.
3. Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 238 (1998).
4. See generally William K. Kelley, Avoiding Constitutional Questions as a Three-Branch
Problem, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 831, 846-65 (2001) (describing both problems in more detail).
5. See, e.g., id. at 846-60 (illustrating the problem as seen in various cases); Harold J.
Krent, Avoidance and Its Costs: Application of the Clear Statement Rule to Supreme Court Review of
NLRB Cases, 15 CONN. L. REV. 209 (1983); Lawrence C. Marshall, Divesting the Courts:
Breaking the Judicial Monopoly on Constitutional Interpretation, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 481, 488-90
(1990); Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 85 GEO. LJ. 1945, 1962 (1997); see alsoJerry L.
Mashaw, Textualism, Constitutionalism, and the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 32 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 827, 840 (1991) ("A court that sustains and applies a statute interpreted by reference
to [the avoidance] canon surely shows no greater solicitude for legislative preferences than
does a court that attempts to understand what was meant and then engages in a serious
constitutional analysis of the validity of the statute."). Judge Posner is among those who
share this view. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM
285 (1985); Richard A. Posner, Statutoy Interpretation---in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50
U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 816 (1983). But see David L. Shapiro, Continuiy and Change in Statutoy
Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 921, 946-47 (1992) (disagreeing with Posner).
6. See, e.g., Kelley, supra note 4, at 860-65; Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding Serious
Constitutional Doubts: The Supreme Court's Construction of Statutes Raising Free Speech Concerns, 30
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preliminary injunction, this ruling can be the whole ball game. While the
constitutional question remains open as a technical matter, as a practical
matter neither Congress nor future litigants attempt to revisit it.8 These
criticisms have received a substantial amount of scholarly attention.9 A
third, more recent criticism, that has received less attention, is that
constitutional avoidance also infringes on separation of powers by
displacing the Executive's law-elaboration authority.10
Indeed, in the administrative context, it is unclear what role
constitutional avoidance should play in the review of an agency's
interpretation of a statute it administers. Consider the following example:
Congress passes a statute that requires the government to deport noncitizens
who have been ordered removed within ninety days or it must release them on
bond in the United States. Congress further provides that certain aliens,
including those who would pose a danger to the public or a flght risk, may be
detained beyond the ninety-day period. But the statute says nothing about how
long beyond ninety days, and it provides no procedures for such continued
detention.
Invoking modem constitutional avoidance, a court interprets the statute to
mean that the government may only detain a noncitizen beyond ninety days so
long as the deportation is reasonably foreseeable; it holds that six months is a
reasonably foreseeable period of time.
By contrast, the Attorneg General, to whom Congress has delegated
authority to implement this statute, interprets the statute to allow continued
detention beyond six months (and perhaps indefinitely) with respect to certain
especially dangerous noncitizens-i.e., those who have been convicted of violent
crimes, that due to a mental condition or a personality disorder would likely
engage in acts of violence in the future, and for which no conditions of release
could be expected to ensure public safety. The Attorney General also provides
detailed procedural protections similar to those the Supreme Court has upheld as
constitutional in the context of indefinite civil detention.
In situations such as this, the reviewing court faces conflicting
commands, or at least an order-of-battle dilemma, between constitutional
avoidance and administrative deference. Under the now-familiar Chevron
two-step approach, the court must defer to an agency's construction of a
U.C. DAvis L. REV. 1, 90 (1996) (stating that under "the pretense of avoidance," courts are
actually making constitutional law); Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 SUP. CT.
R-Ev. 71,88.
7. Schauer, supra note 6, at 88.
8. See, e.g., Marshall, supra note 5, at 485 (finding no instances of congressional
response to an invocation of constitutional avoidance).
9. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
10. See, e.g., Kelley, supra note 4, at 867-72.
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statute it administers if the court finds, at step one, that "the statute is silent
or ambiguous" and then determines, at step two, that the agency's reading
is a "permissible construction of the statute."'" In other words,
constitutional avoidance and Chevron deference are both triggered once a
court determines that a statute is ambiguous. Which doctrine should apply
first? As this example illustrates, the answer to this question often forecloses
agency action. If constitutional avoidance applies first, the court resolves
the ambiguity in favor of its own interpretation and thus invalidates the
agency's construction at Chevron step one. Conversely, if Chevron deference
applies first, the court proceeds to Chevron step two, and then the question
becomes whether the agency's interpretation is reasonable.
Traditionally courts and scholars have concluded that "the avoidance
canon simply trumps Chevron," apparently at Chevron step one. 12 In other
words, the court should construe away the ambiguity to avoid constitutional
doubts and not defer to the agency's interpretation (even if the agency's
interpretation is actually constitutional). At least one court1 3 and one
scholar 14 have more recently suggested that constitutional avoidance may
trump Chevron deference at step two, depending on the seriousness of the
constitutional questions raised by the agency's interpretation. But either
conclusion raises serious separation of powers concerns, as Congress has
delegated interpretative authority first and foremost to the agency.
Notwithstanding, courts continue to apply modem avoidance at either
Chevron step one or step two, and the Supreme Court has issued mixed
messages on the subject.
In light of these separation of powers concerns, this Article advocates
that once Congress has empowered an agency to interpret an ambiguous
11. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
12. Kelley, supra note 4, at 871 (citing EdwardJ. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast
Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 574-75 (1988)); Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial
Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE LJ. 969, 1023 & n.206 (1992) (same); see also Clearing
House Ass'n v. Cuomo, 510 F.3d 105, 113 (2d Cir. 2007) ("That broader principle is rooted
in the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, which the Supreme Court has recognized may,
in some instances, trump the deference typically afforded to an agency's interpretation of the
statute it administers."), affd inpart, rev'd inpart, 129 S. Ct. 2710 (2009).
13. See Hernandez-Carrera v. Carlson, 547 F.3d 1237, 1251 (10th Cir. 2008), cert.
denied, 130 S. Ct. 1011 (2009).
14. Kenneth A. Bamberger, Normative Canons in the Review of Adninistrative Policymaking,
118 YALE LJ. 64, 93-94 (2008); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive's
Power to Say What the Law Is, 115 YALE LJ. 2580, 2608-09 (2006) ("[he executive is not
permitted to construe statutes so as to raise serious constitutional doubts. This principle is
far more ambitious than the modest claim that a statute will be construed so as to be
constitutional. Instead it means that the executive is forbidden to adopt interpretations that
are constitutionally sensitive, even if those interpretations might ultimately be upheld."
(footnote omitted)).
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statutory provision, a court no longer has discretion to replace an agency's
reasonable interpretation with one the court believes better avoids
constitutional questions. Instead, if an agency's interpretation raises
constitutional questions, a court must determine whether the interpretation
is indeed unconstitutional and thus impermissible at Chevron step two. This
approach, in essence, constitutes a return to the classical doctrine of
constitutional avoidance, which counseled that where a statute is
susceptible to more than one interpretation, a court (or here, an agency)
must choose an interpretation that is actually constitutional. While a court
must strike down an administrative interpretation that is actually
unconstitutional at Chevron step two, modern avoidance should play no role
under Chevron step one or two.
This approach finds support from two relatively recent Supreme Court
decisions. In the October Term of 2004, the Court both reaffirmed the
viability of modern avoidance as "a tool for choosing between competing
plausible interpretations of a statutory text" (in Clark v. Martinez),15 and
clarified the agency's primary role in interpreting a statute it administers (in
National Cable & Telecommunications Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Services).16 The
Brand X Court took Chevron one step further and held that "[o]nly a judicial
precedent holding that the statute unambiguously forecloses the agency's
interpretation, and therefore contains no gap for the agency to fill, displaces
a conflicting agency construction." 17 That is because when there is an
ambiguity in a statute an agency administers, there is a "presumption" that
Congress "desired the agency (rather than the courts) to possess whatever
degree of discretion the ambiguity allows."1 8 This insight should apply with
equal force to the use of constitutional avoidance under Chevron. Under a
"Brand X doctrine" of constitutional avoidance, an agency should not be
bound by the court's invocation of constitutional avoidance. The agency
retains the ability to construe the statute in any way it determines meets
Congress's (constitutional) objectives, even if such reasonable interpretation
would have been foreclosed by the court's prior interpretation-or even if a
court would prefer another interpretation the court believes better avoids
constitutional questions. 19
15. Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 381 (2005).
16. Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
17. Id. at 982-83.
18. Id. at 982 (quoting Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 740-41 (1996)).
19. Several years before the Court issued its opinion in BrandX, Professors Merrill and
Hickman advanced a similar argument that Chevron should trump modem constitutional
avoidance. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. LJ.
833, 915 (2001) ("When an agency's interpretation poses an actual conflict with the
Constitution, the court should displace the Chevron doctrine and adopt the interpretation that
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This argument is exemplified by how courts have dealt with
constitutional avoidance in administrative law after Brand X. After
discussing in Part I the inconsistent role constitutional avoidance played in
administrative law before Brand X, Part II of the Article returns to the
example discussed above, which involves the same statutory provision the
Supreme Court interpreted in Clark. Without the benefit of Brand X, the
Fifth and Ninth Circuits held that the Supreme Court's interpretation of
the statute foreclosed the Attorney General's subsequent interpretation.
20
By contrast, the Tenth Circuit, in an opinion authored by Judge Michael
McConnell, reached the opposite conclusion by applying Brand X to allow
the agency's subsequent interpretation to stand. 21  This example
demonstrates how the Brand X doctrine of avoidance restores the proper
separation of powers and allows agencies to exercise their congressionally
delegated authority to interpret the statutes they administer. It also
illustrates the comparative strengths of courts and agencies. Whereas
courts are well equipped to decide whether a construction is actually
constitutional, agencies often are in a better position to fill the holes in
ambiguous statutes they administer with procedural and substantive
safeguards that eliminate constitutional concerns. Moreover, because
agencies may well resolve the constitutional questions through their
interpretations, a Brand X doctrine of avoidance advances the prudential
interest that motivates the avoidance canon in the first place-i.e., that
courts should confront constitutional questions only when absolutely
necessary.
The Article then steps back to explain why the Tenth Circuit's
approach, with one major caveat, is the proper one after the Supreme
Court's decision in Brand X. Part III examines the impact of Brand X on the
doctrine of constitutional avoidance, as well as the separation of powers
concerns that support the abandonment of modern avoidance under
Chevron. While the Article relies primarily on traditional theories of
separation of powers (in both their Article I and Article II form) to justify
such abandonment, Part III also briefly explores how Dean Edward
avoids this result. However, short of an actual conflict with the Constitution, Chevron
instructs that courts should seek to preserve the discretion of agencies to resolve questions of
policy. Thus, whatever the fate of the avoidance of questions canon in other contexts, it
should be abandoned in cases that arise under the Chevron doctrine." (footnote omitted)).
20. Tran v. Mukasey, 515 F.3d 478, 485 (5th Cir. 2008); Thai v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d
790, 798-99 (9th Cir. 2004).
21. Hernandez-Carrera v. Carlson, 547 F.3d 1237, 1242 (10th Cir. 2008), cert. denied,
130 S. Ct. 1011 (2009). The Supreme Court may well decide to resolve this circuit conflict
regarding the validity of the regulation at issue, and Brand X and Clark arguably confirm that
the Tenth Circuit got it (mostly) right.
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Rubin's network theory of government affects the analysis. Network theory
further clarifies the separation of powers concerns at play in this context by
more precisely capturing the expansive role of the modern administrative
state, including the recognition that administrative agencies-not courts-
"are generally the primary interpreters of statutes in the modern state." 22
Under network theory, unless otherwise authorized (which they are not),
courts should limit the constitutional aspect of their "supervisory" role to
preclude agency constructions that are actually unconstitutional.
23
Part IV then explores how this Brand X doctrine of constitutional
avoidance plays out in a number of administrative contexts, ranging from
environmental protection and national labor relations to immigration and
national security. The purpose of the Article is not to advocate for specific
outcomes in particular areas of administrative law. To be sure, there is
often a strong correlation between the invocation of constitutional
avoidance and the political nature of a particular statutory scheme. But
this Article is not intended to be a call for a new administration to push
constitutional boundaries and essentially reverse those judicial decisions
with which the administration disagrees. The Article, instead, merely
recognizes that a Brand X approach to constitutional avoidance in
administrative law preserves the proper separation of powers and that it
should be the proper reconciliation of the conflicting commands of Chevron
deference and constitutional avoidance.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL AVOIDANCE IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Much confusion exists about the interplay between Chevron deference and
constitutional avoidance. This confusion can be explained, in part, by two
developments that complicated the role of avoidance in administrative law.
First, the now-familiar Chevron two-step approach did not arrive until
1984-long after the doctrine of constitutional avoidance-yet the Court
has never squarely reconciled the two seemingly conflicting commands.
Second, the doctrine of constitutional avoidance has been modernized so as
to avoid not just unconstitutional constructions, but even constructions that
merely implicate constitutional doubts. It probably makes sense to begin
with the latter.
22. EDWARD L. RUBIN, BEYOND CAMELOT: RETHINKING POLITICS AND LAW FOR THE
MODERN STATE 64 (2005).
23. See id. at 91-94 (proposing "authorization" and "supervision" as substitutes for the
concepts of "power" and "discretion").
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A. Constitutional Avoidance: Classical v. Modem Formulations
The doctrine of constitutional avoidance is a canon of statutory
construction that has a "classical" and "modern" form. 24  Classical
avoidance, which emerged in the 1800s, commands that "as between two
possible interpretations of a statute, by one of which it would be
unconstitutional and by the other valid, [the Court's] plain duty is to adopt
that which will save the Act." 25  In other words, this tool of statutory
construction only applies if one construction is actually unconstitutional.
Developed in the 1900s, modern avoidance, however, takes the rule one
step further: "[W]here a statute is susceptible of two constructions, by one
of which grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the other
of which such questions are avoided, [a court's] duty is to adopt the
latter. ' 26 It is sufficient to invoke the modern doctrine if a construction
implicates 'a serious doubt' as to its constitutionality," 27 "raise[s] serious
constitutional problems," 28 or "raise[s] a multitude of constitutional
24. Vermeule, supra note 5, at 1949. Professor Kloppenberg appears to make a similar
delineation between "narrow" and "broad" constitutional avoidance. Kloppenberg, supra
note 6, at 10-11, 90-92; see also Vermeule, supra note 5, at 1949 n.24 ("Classical and modern
avoidance seem to correspond to what Kloppenberg terms the 'narrow' and 'broad' versions
of the avoidance canon."). Professor Vermeule also identifies a third form of constitutional
avoidance-"procedural avoidance"-which is not a canon of statutory construction and
thus not directly relevant for the purposes of this Article. See id. at 1948 ("This is perhaps the
most general and protean category of avoidance principles, but the core tenet is that courts
should order the issues for adjudication ... with an eye to obviating the need to render
constitutional rulings on the merits."); see also Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding Constitutional
Questions, 35 B.C. L. REV. 1003, 1015-24 (1994) (discussing various constitutional avoidance
or "last resort" rules as articulated, inter alia, in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authoriy, 297 U.S.
288, 341 (1936) (Brandeis,J., concurring)).
25. Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 148 (1927) (Holmes, J., concurring) (citing for
this "settled rule" United States ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Del. & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366,
407 (1909); see also United States v. Standard Brewery, Inc., 251 U.S. 210, 220 (1920); Texas
v. E. Tex. R.R. Co., 258 U.S. 204, 217 (1922); Bratton v. Chandler, 260 U.S. 110, 114
(1922); Pan. R.R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 390 (1924)). Professor Vermeule traces
classical constitutional avoidance back to before Marbugy v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137
(1803), to Mossman v. Higginson, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 12 (1800). Vermeule, supra note 5, at 1948 &
n.13. Others believe Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804), was the
starting point. See, e.g., Kelley, supra note 4, at 837 & n.23; Schauer, supra note 6, at 73 n.9.
26. Del. & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. at 408.
27. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 689 (2001) (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S.
22, 62 (1932)).
28. EdwardJ. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485
U.S. 568, 575 (1988). The DeBartolo Court recognized an important limitation on the
doctrine, in that the alternative construction the court chooses to adopt must not be "plainly
contrary to the intent of Congress." Id. That is because a driving rationale for constitutional
avoidance is the recognition that "Congress, like this Court, is bound by and swears an oath
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problems." 29 The court need not determine if the interpretation at issue is
actually unconstitutional.
Justice Thomas has summarized the critical difference between the
classical and modern approaches:
The modern canon of avoidance is a doctrine under which courts construe
ambiguous statutes to avoid constitutional doubts, but this doctrine has its
origins in a very different form of the canon. Traditionally, the avoidance
canon was not a doctrine under which courts read statutes to avoid mere
constitutional doubts. Instead, it commanded courts, when faced with two
plausible constructions of a statute-one constitutional and the other
unconstitutional-to choose the constitutional reading.30
The "basic difference" is thus that the classical version asks whether "the
statute would be unconstitutional, while the [modern version] requires only
a determination that one plausible reading might be unconstitutional."'3 1
Both are implicated only when the statute is ambiguous, but the classical
version resolves the ambiguity by choosing a particular construction that is
constitutional. The modern version, by contrast, construes the ambiguity
to avoid even constitutional doubts without definitively resolving whether
those doubts would make the statute unconstitutional.
B. Conflicting Commands.- Modern Avoidance v. Chevron
This wrinkle between the classical and modern forms of avoidance
carries added significance in administrative law. In Chevron, the Court
delineated between normal statutory interpretation and review of an
agency's construction of a statute it administers. It established a two-step
inquiry:
First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the
to uphold the Constitution. The courts will therefore not lightly assume that Congress
intended to infringe constitutionally protected liberties or usurp power constitutionally
forbidden it." Id.
29. Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 380-81 (2005). The Clark Court may have
further expanded the modem doctrine by holding that "[i]f one of [the plausible
constructions] would raise a multitude of constitutional problems, the other should prevail-
whether or not those constitutional problems pertain to the particular litigant before the
Court." Id. This "lowest common denominator approach," id. at 380, arguably "allows an
end run around the black-letter constitutional doctrine governing facial and as-applied
constitutional challenges to statutes: A lifigant ordinarily cannot attack statutes as
constitutionally invalid based on constitutional doubts concerning other litigants or factual
circumstances." Id. at 396 (Thomas, J., dissenting). But see id. at 381-82 (majority opinion)
(responding to the dissent).
30. Id. at 395 (Thomas,J., dissenting).
31. Vermeule, supra note 5, at 1949 (emphases omitted); see also Kelley, supra note 4, at
839 (noting the same).
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precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of
the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court
determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue,
the court does not simply impose its own construction of the statute, as would
be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation.
Rather... the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based
on a permissible construction of the statute.
32
The Court underscored that, at step two, a court "need not conclude that
the agency construction was the only one it permissibly could have
adopted.., or even the reading the court would have reached if the
question initially had arisen in ajudicial proceeding." 33 The Court justified
such deference to administrative interpretations on two main grounds.
First, "The responsibilities for assessing the wisdom of such policy
choices and resolving the struggle between competing views of the public
interest are not judicial ones." 34  This is a matter of institutional
competence or expertise: "Filling these gaps, the [Chevron] Court explained,
involves difficult policy choices that agencies are better equipped to make
than courts. '35 Second, deference "to an agency's construction of a statute
that it administers is premised on the theory that a statute's ambiguity
constitutes an implicit delegation from Congress to the agency to fill in the
statutory gaps." 36  The Chevron Court explained that these two main
objectives reinforce core democratic principles of political accountability:
Judges are not experts in the field, and are not part of either political branch
of the Government. Courts must, in some cases, reconcile competing
political interests, but not on the basis of the judges' personal policy
preferences. In contrast, an agency to which Congress has delegated policy-
making responsibilities may, within the limits of that delegation, properly rely
upon the incumbent administration's views of wise policy to inform its
judgments. While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the
Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of
the Government to make such policy choices-resolving the competing
32. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984) (footnotes omitted).
33. Id. at 843 n. 11.
34. Id. at 866.
35. Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980
(2005) (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865-66).
36. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000); see also
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Reconciling Chevron and Stare Decsis, 85 GEO. LJ. 2225, 2231 (1997)
("Chevron sends a clear message to the Legislative Branch: If you ... decline to make a policy
decision through the legislative process, we will deem your failure to so act as ceding the
power to make that policy decision to the President.").
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interests which Congress itself either inadvertently did not resolve, or
intentionally left to be resolved by the agency charged with the
administration of the statute in light of everyday realities.
37
When modern constitutional avoidance and Chevron are considered
together, a court is faced with conflicting commands if it determines that a
statutory provision an agency administers is ambiguous and could be read
to raise serious constitutional doubts. The court must begin by either
avoiding a construction that implicates the constitutional question or
deferring to an agency's answer to the question. Under classical avoidance,
by contrast, there is no real dilemma. The court is commanded to construe
a statute to be constitutional, and an agency does not have discretion to
construe a statute unconstitutionally. Thus, the agency in essence must
apply classical avoidance in its interpretation; otherwise, the court should
strike down the agency's interpretation as impermissible because it is
actually unconstitutional.
But modern avoidance, as discussed, reaches beyond prohibiting
unconstitutional constructions to precluding even potentially constitutional
constructions. It is quite possible, for instance, that an agency's
construction of a statute would avoid all constitutional concerns. Yet, if
modern avoidance were applied before Chevron deference, a court may well
construe away all ambiguity in the statute and thus pretermit the Chevron
inquiry at step one. In that sense, avoidance would trump Chevron
deference.
C. Pre-Brand X Confusion: Avoidance's Role Under Chevron
Before Brand X and Clark, it was far from clear how to reconcile the
conflicting commands of constitutional avoidance and Chevron. And the
Supreme Court oftentimes did not reach the correct result. The Court first
confronted this dilemma in Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast
Building & Construction Trades Council.38 There, a union was distributing
handbills that discouraged consumers from shopping at a mall because one
of the mall contractors paid substandard wages and fringe benefits. The
37. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865-66; see also Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114
HARV. L. REv. 2245, 2373 (2001) ("As first conceived, the Chevron deference rule had its
deepest roots in a conception of agencies as instruments of the President, entitled to make
policy choices, within the gaps left by Congress, by virtue of his relationship to the public.");
Randolph J. May, Defining Deference Down: Independent Agencies and Chevron Deference, 58
ADMIN. L. REV. 429, 447 (2006) (reviewing rationales for Chevron deference and concluding
that "the agency expertise justification plays second fiddle to the primary political
accountability rationale in Chevron").
38. 485 U.S. 568 (1988).
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contractor filed a complaint with the National Labor Relations Board,
charging that the union had engaged in unfair labor practices. The Board
ultimately concluded that the handbilling activity violated labor laws
because it constituted economic retaliation. 39 The Court noted that the
Board's construction "would normally be entitled to [Chevron] deference,"
but it found pertinent "[a]nother rule of statutory construction"-i.e.,
modern constitutional avoidance.
40
The Court found that "the Board's construction of the statute, as applied
in this case, poses serious questions of the validity of [the statute] under the
First Amendment."'4 1 The Court did not decide the constitutional question.
Indeed, it noted that:
Even if [the Board's] construction of the Act were thought to be a permissible
one, we are quite sure that in light of the traditional rule followed in Catholic
Bishop, we must independently inquire whether there is another
interpretation, not raising these serious constitutional concerns, that may
fairly be ascribed to [the Act] .42
The Court concluded that "the section is open to a construction that
obviates deciding whether a congressional prohibition of
handbilling ... would violate the First Amendment. '43 Based on this
holding, some scholars (and courts) have read DeBartolo as standing for the
proposition that "the avoidance canon simply trumps Chevron."
'44
In Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. Army Corps of Engineers,45 the
Court again seemed to weigh in on the interaction between Chevron and
constitutional avoidance-and again got it wrong. There, the Court found
at Chevron step one that the statute was clear that the federal government
did not have jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act to regulate isolated
ponds and mudflats. It thus refused to give Chevron deference to the
government's contrary construction. The Court went a step further,
however, and stated that it would not give Chevron deference even if the
statute were not clear. Citing DeBartolo, the Court explained that "[w]here
39. Id. at 573. The National Labor Relations Board originally concluded that the
handbilling violated another provision of the National Labor Relations Act, but the
Supreme Court reversed and remanded. EdwardJ. DeBartolo Corp. v. NLRB, 463 U.S.
147, 155-58 (1983).
40. DeBartolo Corp., 485 U.S. at 574-75 (citing NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440
U.S. 490, 499-501, 504 (1979)).
41. Id. at 575.
42. Id. at 577.
43. Id. at 578.
44. See Kelley, supra note 4, at 871 (discussing case law and scholarship); Merrill, supra
note 12, at 1023 & n.206; see also Clearing House Ass'n v. Cuomo, 510 F.3d 105, 114 (2d
Cir. 2007), affd in part, rev'd in part, 129 S. Ct. 2710 (2009).
45. 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
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an administrative interpretation of a statute invokes the outer limits of
Congress' power, we expect a clear indication that Congress intended that
result."' 46 "This requirement," the Court explained, "stems from our
prudential desire not to needlessly reach constitutional issues and our
assumption that Congress does not casually authorize administrative
agencies to interpret a statute to push the limit of congressional
authority. '47  The Court stressed that this rule applies if "significant
constitutional questions [are] raised by [the government's] application of
their regulations." 48 Because the government's interpretation raised such
constitutional questions, the Court rejected the request for administrative
deference.
49
The Court reached a different conclusion in Rust v. Sullivan.50 There, a
divided 5-4 Court upheld federal regulations that prohibited projects from
receiving family planning funds that provided for abortions, or even
counseled patients to consider an abortion. The Court qualified modern
constitutional avoidance by the principle that "avoidance of a difficulty will
not be pressed to the point of disingenuous evasion." 51  It noted that,
46. Id. at 172. This formulation of the modern doctrine as a clear statement rule
appears to confuse the doctrine with other doctrines, such as what some have called the
"elephants-in-mouseholes" doctrine where courts "have declined to afford deference to
agency interpretations where an agency's proposed interpretation relies on an insufficiently
definite statutory provision in order to greatly increase the agency's power." Jacob Loshin &
Aaron Nielson, Hiding Nondelegation in Mouseholes, 62 ADMIN. L. REv. 19, 20 (2010). This
doctrine receives its name from the Court's opinion in Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'ns, in
which Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, stated that Congress "does not alter the
fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisions-it does
not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes." 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001). As Loshin
and Nielson have explained, this doctrine is really a reinvention of the nondelegation
doctrine to minimize what the Supreme Court perceives to be agency action in excess of
congressional delegation. See Loshin & Nielson, supra, at 53. While there is some apparent
overlap between these doctrines, modem constitutional avoidance sweeps much more
broadly in two respects. First, it applies to all interpretations that raise constitutioral
questions even if there is no question that the delegation was proper. And the American
Trucking rule seems to require an actual finding of impermissible delegation, whereas modern
avoidance requires no such similar finding of unconstitutionality-only a finding of serious
constitutional questions.
47. Solid WasteAgeny, 531 U.S. at 172-73.
48. Id. at 174.
49. Id. This was a 5-4 decision with a vigorous dissent. Justice Stevens emphasized, in
his dissent, that the majority's "refusal [to defer to the government's construction] is
unfaithful to ... Chevron"-though he did not comment on the majority's use of
constitutional avoidance. Id. at 191 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
50. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
51. Id. at 191 (quoting George Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose, 289 U. S. 373, 379
(1933)).
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because Congress forbade federal funding for programs where abortion is a
method of family planning, any regulations promulgated to implement this
prohibition would raise serious constitutional questions after Roe v. Wade.
So based on this ruling, the possibility of difficult constitutional questions is
not enough to trump Chevron deference. Although it found that the
petitioners' constitutional arguments were not "without some force," the
Court found the regulations to be constitutional and thus reasonable under
Chevron step two. 52 In his dissent, Justice Blackmun contended that the
Court had sidestepped the modern avoidance canon to reach the
constitutional questions. 53 Justice O'Connor filed a separate dissent,
arguing that the Court should have struck down the regulations based on
modern constitutional avoidance: "It is enough in this litigation to conclude
that neither the language nor the history of [the statute] compels the
Secretary's interpretation, and that the interpretation raises serious First
Amendment concerns."
54
It is difficult to derive a coherent, consistent rule from DeBartolo, Solid
Waste Agenc, and Rust. It is thus unsurprising that courts have struggled to
apply constitutional avoidance in administrative law.55 The Ninth Circuit's
en banc opinion in Morales-Izquierdo v. Gonzales is illustrative. 56 There, the
petitioner challenged regulations that allowed for summary reinstatement
of a removal order upon unlawful reentry to the United States. The
regulations were based on a statute that provided that a "prior order of
removal is reinstated from its original date and is not subject to being
reopened or reviewed, [and] the alien is not eligible and may not apply for
any [immigration] relief."57  The challenged regulations allowed an
52. Id
53. Id. at 205 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Whether or not one believes that these
regulations are valid, it avoids reality to contend that they do not give rise to serious
constitutional questions. The canon is applicable to these cases not because 'it was likely
that [the regulations] . . .would be challenged on constitutional grounds,' but because the
question squarely presented by the regulations-the extent to which the Government may
attach an otherwise unconstitutional condition to the receipt of a public benefit-implicates
a troubled area of our jurisprudence in which a court ought not entangle itself
unnecessarily." (citation omitted)).
54. Id. at 224-25 (O'Connor,J., dissenting).
55. See, e.g., Whitaker v. Thompson, 353 F.3d 947, 952 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (suggesting
that modern constitutional avoidance would "require [the court] to abandon or qualify
Chevron deference"). Looking at post-9/11 national security cases, Professor Vermeule
concluded that "[s]ome cases hawz. applied just the priority rules that the commentators
recommend, [i.e., that constitutional avoidance trump Chevron], but some have not." Adrian
Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative Law, 122 HARV. L. REv. 1095, 1130 (2009) (discussing
Tabbaa v. Chertoff, 509 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2007)).
56. 486 F.3d 484 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc).
57. 8 U.S.C. § 123 l(a)(5) (2006).
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immigration officer to reinstate the removal order without a hearing before
an immigration judge. 58 The Ninth Circuit joined the First, Sixth, Eighth,
and Eleventh Circuits in upholding the regulations as a permissible
construction of the statute under Chevron.
59
Unlike the challenges raised in the other circuits, the petitioner in
Morales-Izquierdo asked the Ninth Circuit to invoke modern avoidance. He
argued that "construing the statute so as to require that reinstatement
hearings be held before an immigration judge would avoid constitutional
problems that arise by assigning the reinstatement function to an
immigration officer." 60 Judge Kozinski, writing for the en bane majority,
stated that modern avoidance plays no role at Chevron step two:
When Congress has expficitly or implicitly left a gap for an agency to fill, and
the agency has filled it, we have no authority to re-construe the statute, even
to avoid potential constitutional problems; we can only decide whether the
agency's interpretation reflects a plausible reading of the statutory text.
6 1
That is because at Chevron step two the inquiry is not whether the agency's
construction is the best interpretation, only whether it is reasonable. The
court then held that the regulations were constitutional and reasonable.
Judge Sidney Thomas, joined by three of his colleagues on the eleven-
judge en banc panel, dissented. In addition to contending that the statute
unambiguously required a hearing before an immigration judge, the dissent
argued that modem constitutional avoidance would preclude the
government's interpretation. The dissent conceded that constitutional
avoidance may not apply at Chevron step two, but argued that, as a tool of
statutory construction, "the avoidance canon rests on a judicial
presumption that Congress always intends to steer clear of constitutional
boundaries.... Mt certainly pertains to the step one determination of
whether Congress intended to preclude the agency's interpretation. " 62 The
dissent cited DeBartolo and Solid Waste Agency as cases decided at step one
based on constitutional avoidance. 63
58. 8 C.F.R. § 241.8(a) (2011).
59. Morales-Izquierdo, 486 F.3d at 489, 495. The Ninth Circuit panel had ruled that the
regulation was ultra vires because "[t]he plain statutory language, supported by the structure
of the legislation, provides that an immigration judge must conduct all proceedings for
deciding the inadmissibility or deportability of an alien." Morales-Izquierdo v. Ashcroft,
388 F.3d 1299, 1305 (9th Cir. 2004), rehg en bancgranted, 423 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2005). The
panel thus had no occasion to invoke the doctrine of constitutional avoidance.
60. Morales-Izquierdo, 486 F.3d at 492.
61. Id. at 493.
62. Id. at 504 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Judge Thomas also authored the vacated panel
opinion. Morales-Izquierdo, 388 F.3d at 1301.
63. Morales-Izquierdo, 486 F.3d at 504 (citing Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v.
U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 172-73 (2001); Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v.
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While theoretically plausible, the dissent's reading of DeBartolo and Solid
Waste Agency arguably does not square with the Court's actual holdings in
those cases. Nor, for that matter, does the majority's reading. To be sure,
the Court was unambiguously clear in both cases that the agency's
construction of the statute was impermissible because it did not avoid
serious constitutional questions. It does not necessarily follow, however,
that constitutional avoidance trumps Chevron at step one. Contrary to the
dissent's characterization, in neither case did the Court invoke
constitutional avoidance to expressly declare that the statute is
unambiguous at Chevron step one. Instead, the Solid Waste Agency Court
seemed to suggest that modern avoidance applies at step two. The Court
held that the government's interpretation-due to the constitutional
questions it raised-was unreasonable absent "a clear indication that
Congress intended that result." 64 The DeBartolo Court also seemed to apply
modern avoidance at step two, only invoking the doctrine if the agency's
"otherwise acceptable construction of [the] statute would raise serious
constitutional problems." 65  Either formulation would thus appear to
conflict with the Ninth Circuit majority's view that avoidance plays no role
at Chevron step two (in addition to the dissent's view that the doctrine applies
at step one).66 But even that reading is unclear.
In sum, before Brand X the Supreme Court had applied (incorrectly)
modern avoidance in administrative law, though it never really explained
why. 67 Contrary to the dissent in Morales-Izquierdo and the views of several
Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988)).
64. Solid WasteAgency, 531 U.S. at 172.
65. DeBartolo Corp., 485 U.S. at 575; see also Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v.
NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 387 (1998) (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring) ("We have held that when an
interpretation raises such constitutional concerns, the Board's interpretation of the Act is not
entitled to deference."); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 923 (1995) ("[W]e have rejected
agency interpretations to which we would otherwise defer where they raise constitutional
questions. When the Justice Department's interpretation of the [Voting Rights] Act compels
race-based districting, it by definition raises a serious constitutional question and should not
receive deference." (citations omitted)).
66. The Ninth Circuit's en banc opinion could also be read as holding that
constitutional avoidance plays no role at Chevron step two in this particular case as the
regulations do not raise constitutional concerns. See Morales-Izquierdo, 486 F.3d at 495-98
(rejecting the constitutional challenges to the regulations).
67. See, e.g., Elliott Greenfield, A Leniy Exception to Chevron Deference, 58 BAYLOR
L. REv. 1, 31 (2006) ("The [DeBartolo] Court provides no further justification in brushing
aside Chevron other than its statement that the constitutional avoidance canon is a 'cardinal
principle' that has been applied since the early days of the Court."); Kelley, supra note 4, at
871 ("Unfortunately, however, the opinion in Edward ]. DeBartolo Corp. contains no
explanation for why the Court reached that conclusion."); Merrill, supra note 12, at 1023
("Chevron itself supplies no rationale for such a holding.").
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scholars, the Court arguably did not hold that modern constitutional
avoidance trumps Chevron deference at step one by construing away all
ambiguity in the statute. 68 Instead, to the extent a coherent rule can be
gleaned, the Court seemed to hold that an agency's otherwise reasonable
interpretation may be impermissible if that interpretation raises serious
constitutional concerns (thus contradicting the Ninth Circuit majority's rule
in Morales-Izquierdo).
II. BRAND XAVOIDANCE EXEMPLIFIED
The effect of the Supreme Court's decision in Brand X on the interplay
between modern avoidance and Chevron deference is best understood with a
concrete example-this one from the immigration context. This example
also underscores the separation of powers concerns at play when modern
avoidance is applied in the review of administrative interpretations of law,
as well as the comparative institutional strengths of courts and agencies in
addressing constitutional problems in ambiguous statutes that agencies
administer.
A. Competing Judicial and Administrative Interpretations
Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, the government must
generally remove from the country a noncitizen who has been ordered
removed within ninety days of the issuance of a final removal order;
otherwise the noncitizen must be released back into the United States.
69
Congress, however, provided that noncitizens "may be detained beyond the
68. The dissent in Morales-Izquierdo may well have confused classical and modem
constitutional avoidance. The former, where a court rules that a particular construction
would violate the Constitution, would arguably eliminate a particular construction of a
statute at Chevron step one. Of course, a court may still consider this a step two issue and
hold that the agency's interpretation is impermissible or unreasonable because it is
unconstitutional. It is quite another matter, as discussed in the text, to hold that an agency
lacks discretion to adopt a construction, or that an agency's interpretation is unreasonable,
because its interpretation raises (and then adequately answers) constitutional questions.
Notwithstanding, a panel of the Ninth Circuit has since adopted the dissent's view
and held that constitutional avoidance applies at Chevron step one. See Diouf v. Napolitano,
634 F.3d 1081, 1090 n.1 1(9th Cir. 2011) ("We have held that the constitutional avoidance
canon plays no role during step two in the Chevron. But the canon applies at Chevron step one,
because it is 'a means of giving effect to congressional intent."' (quoting Clark v. Martinez,
543 U.S. 371, 382 (2005))). As discussed, the Ninth Circuit in Dioufwould have been well
served to have distinguished between modem and classical constitutional avoidance and to
have held that classical constitutional avoidance applies as Chevron step two (i.e., that an
agency cannot choose an unconstitutional interpretation of a statute), as the panel appeared
to find the regulation to be unconstitutional. See id. at 1091.
69. 8 U.S.C. § 123 l(a)(1)(A) (2006).
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[ninety-day] removal period" if they fall within one of three categories: (1)
those ordered removed who are inadmissible; (2) those ordered removed as
a result of violations of status requirements or entry conditions, violations of
criminal law, or reasons of security or foreign policy; and (3) those ordered
removed who the Attorney General determines to be a risk to the
community or a flight risk.70 Congress placed no explicit limitation on the
length of this continued detention.
In Zadvydas v. Davis, 71 the Supreme Court considered whether
noncitizens held pursuant to the second category could be held indefinitely
(and it did so in the absence of an agency's interpretation of that statutory
provision). Because no country would accept them, the government
continued to detain these noncitizens for years beyond the ninety-day
removal period. The government argued that the language "may be
detained beyond the removal period" authorized indefinite detention.
72
The Court, however, reasoned that indefinite detention, especially due to
the lack of any procedural protections, would present serious constitutional
problems under the Due Process Clause. 73 Applying the modern doctrine
of constitutional avoidance, the Court held that the statute was ambiguous
and construed it to mean that "once removal is no longer reasonably
foreseeable, continued detention is no longer authorized by statute. ' 74 The
Court concluded that six months beyond the ninety-day removal period
was a presumptively reasonable detention period in which to effectuate
removal. 75
Four years later in Clark v. Martinez,76 the Court was asked again to
interpret the continued detention statute-this time with respect to the first
category of noncitizens who had never been legally admitted into the
country. (Again, no formal agency interpretation was at issue.) The
government argued that, unlike indefinite detention of admitted yet
removable noncitizens-the second category addressed in Zadvydas--
indefinite detention of inadmissible noncitizens does not raise serious
constitutional concerns because inadmissible noncitizens do not have the
same rights and privileges under the Constitution. It relied on the Zadvydas
Court's statement that any "[a]liens who have not yet gained initial
admission to this country would present a very different question." 77 The
70. Id. § 1231(a)(6).
71. 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
72. Id. at 689.
73. Id. at 690.
74. Id. at 699.
75. Id. at 701.
76. 543 U.S. 371 (2005).
77. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 682.
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Court disagreed, holding that "[t]he operative language of § 1231(a)(6),
'may be detained beyond the removal period,' applies without
differentiation to all three categories of aliens that are its subject," and that
"[t]o give these same words a different meaning for each category would be
to invent a statute rather than interpret one."
7 8
Following Zadvydas but before Clark, the Attorney General promulgated,
through notice-and-comment rulemaking, a set of comprehensive
regulations intended to narrow the scope of his detention authority and
bring it in conformity with the Court's ruling in Zadvydas.
79 As to most
noncitizens-including those who fall within the Clark category one
(inadmissible noncitizens) and the Zadvydas category two (certain removable
noncitizens)-the regulations provide for release within six months if there
is no likelihood of removal. 80 As to a subset of those noncitizens in the third
category of § 1231(a)(6) ("risk to the community") who pose heightened
risks to the public or the security of the United States, the regulations
establish procedures for continued detention beyond the six-month
presumptively reasonable period. With respect to noncitizens who are
"determined to be specially dangerous," the regulations provide:
Subject to the review procedures provided in this section, the Service shall
continue to detain an alien if the release of the alien would pose a special
danger to the public, because:
(i) The alien has previously committed one or more crimes of violence as
defined in 18 U.S.C. 16;
(ii) Due to a mental condition or personality disorder and behavior
associated with that condition or disorder, the alien is likely to engage in
acts of violence in the future; and
(iii) No conditions of release can reasonably be expected to ensure the
safety of the public.81
The review procedures set forth in the regulations include the following:
If the government determines in writing-after arranging for a report by a
physician based on a full medical and psychiatric exam 2-that these
conditions apply, then an immigration judge holds a preliminary hearing
to determine whether there are grounds for further proceedings. The
noncitizen is given a list of free legal service providers and provided an
interpreter, he has the right to examine evidence, and he may cross-
78. Clark, 543 U.S. at 378.
79. See8 C.F.R. §§ 241.13-.14(2011).
80. Id. § 241.13(g)(1).
81. Id. §241.14()(1).
82. Id. § 241.14()(3).
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examine government witnesses and physicians who issued any report.
83 If
the government meets its burden, the immigration judge then holds a
merits hearing where the government must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the noncitizen "should remain in custody because the alien's
release would pose a special danger to the public" based on the above three
conditions. 84 The noncitizen has a right to appeal an adverse decision
85
and may seek review of his custody status based on changed circumstances
every six months. 86 The government must provide an ongoing, periodic
review of the noncitizen's continued detention.
87
B. Comparative Strengths of Courts and Agencies
Before turning to how courts have attempted to address these competing
interpretations of the continued-detention statute, it is worth pausing to
consider the stark difference between the judicial and administrative
interpretations of the statute. The Court's interpretation is a blunt, one-
size-fits-all approach that draws a bright-line rule that lower courts (and
other government actors) can apply easily and consistently. The Court
makes no attempt to fill in the holes in the statute with additional
procedures, substantive criteria, or other safeguards to address the
constitutional concerns. Indeed, the Court appears to suggest that such
efforts "would be to invent a statute rather than interpret one.
'88
This observation is not meant as a criticism, as courts are not (and
should not be) in the business of construing ambiguous statutes by
interjecting policies and provisions not articulated by a politically
accountable body. Not only would such judicial policymaking intrude on
democratic process and separation of powers, but courts also lack the
institutional competence to engage in such policymaking efforts in the first
place. Courts are much better at deciding whether a particular statutory or
regulatory scheme is constitutional than they are at figuring out how to
design a statutory or regulatory scheme so as to avoid constitutional
problems while still achieving stated policy objectives.
The Attorney General's interpretation, by contrast, fills in the holes in
the statute with procedural safeguards and substantive criteria aimed at
eliminating the constitutional concerns while also advancing the policy
objectives set forth in the statute. Unlike courts, agencies are charged by
83. Id. § 241.14(g).
84. Id. § 241.14(i)(1) (referring to the three criteria found in 8 C.F.R. § 241.14(0(1)).
85. Id. § 241.14(i)(4).
86. Id. § 241.14(k)(3).
87. Id. § 241.14(k)(1)(citing 8 C.F.R. § 241.14(0(1)).
88. Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 378 (2005).
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Congress to fill in the holes (and by the Executive to execute the law) in
precisely this manner. And they have several tools to assist them in this
policymaking function. For instance, as opposed to courts, agencies employ
experts in the relevant regulatory context who are familiar with the policy
objectives and may have encountered similar deficiencies in procedures or
substantive criteria in related contexts. 89 Agencies also have access to
bureaucrats in other administrative contexts with expertise in designing
regulatory schemes that provide sufficient and efficient procedures.
Moreover, in certain contexts such as this one, agencies benefit from
direct feedback from the public and nongovernmental experts through
notice-and-comment rulemaking. Such rulemaking is the process by which
a proposed regulation is published in the Federal Register and is open to
comment by the general public. The agency must respond to significant
objections to the agency's proposed regulation, and the adequacy of its
response is subject to judicial review.9 0 Through this notice-and-comment
rulemaking process, the agency can benefit from nongovernmental experts
in the field. By considering improvements suggested by these experts and
the general public, the regulations agencies ultimately adopt are likely to be
more effective in providing adequate procedures, realizing the policy
objectives, and avoiding unintended consequences. 9' Indeed, Congress has
imposed notice-and-comment rulemaking, as the Sixth Circuit explained,
primarily "to get public input so as to get the wisest rules. '92 Additionally,
such rulemaking allows the President and Congress to influence the
regulations that agencies adopt-thus increasing political accountability. 93
89. See, e.g., 1 RIC-IARDJ. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6.9, at 377
(4th ed. 2002) ("An agency with expertise in a particular area of regulation has an enormous
advantage over a reviewing court in making this complicated judgment."); Bamberger, supra
note 14, at 96 (explaining that "the shortcomings of judicial capacity, which [normative]
canons are, at least in part, intended to overcome-inferior capacity for fact-finding and
policymaking on one hand, and a hesitance to strike down, on direct constitutional grounds,
legislation enacted through democratic processes, on the other-are the very same
competencies at which agencies may excel"); Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll, &
Barry R. Weingast, Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. EcON. &
ORG. 243, 247 (1987) (noting that bureaucrats become experts in their own policy areas).
90. See, e.g, M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REV.
1383, 1390 (2004); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Distinguishing Legislative Rulesfrom Interpretative Rules,
52 ADMIN. L. REv. 547, 549-50 (2000).
91. See, e.g., Pierce, supra note 90, at 550 ("[Notice-and-comment rulemaking] enhances
the quality of rules by allowing the agency to obtain a better understanding of a proposed
rule's potential effects in various circumstances and by allowing the agency to consider
alternative rules that might be more effective in furthering the agency's goals or that might
have fewer unintended adverse effects.").
92. Dismas Charities, Inc. v. DOJ, 401 F.3d 666, 680 (6th Cir. 2005).
93. See Pierce, supra note 90, at 550. Indeed, the President, through the Office of
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In sum, this example of competing judicial and administrative
interpretations underscores the comparative institutional strengths of courts
and agencies. To be sure, courts have expertise to decide whether a
statutory or regulatory scheme is actually constitutional. But agencies, as a
practical matter, are often better equipped to fill the holes in the statutes
they administer with sufficient procedural and substantive safeguards to
avoid constitutional questions in the first place. This is particularly true
where, as here, Congress has required the agency to engage in notice-and-
comment rulemaking. This practical consideration of comparative
expertise provides further support for discontinuing the use of modern
constitutional avoidance in the review of administrative interpretations of
law.
C. Judicial Attempts to Address Competing Interpretations
Despite the fact that the Attorney General's interpretation arguably
resolves the constitutional questions the Zadvydas Court identified, courts
have not reached the same conclusion about whether the judicial or
administrative interpretation should control.
The Ninth Circuit was the first federal court of appeals to consider the
constitutionality of these regulations. In Thai v. Ashcroft, a three-judge panel
struck down the regulations as foreclosed by Zadvydas.94 The panel held
that the agency was constrained by the Zadvydas Court's imposition of a six-
month limitation on how long the government could hold a noncitizen
subject to removal. In other words, the Supreme Court in Zadvydas
construed away all ambiguity in the statute such that the agency no longer
had discretion to provide an alternative interpretation. This approach
parallels the traditional application of modern avoidance in the review of
administrative interpretations of law, in that modern avoidance was
arguably applied to construe away the ambiguity or otherwise override the
administrative interpretation.
Judge Kozinski, joined by four other judges, dissented from the denial of
rehearing en banc. 95 The dissent noted that Zadvydas only dealt with
nondangerous removable noncitizens covered by the second category of the
statute, not especially dangerous removable noncitizens covered by the
third category. Moreover, "The [Attorney General's] regulations are
Information and Regulatory Affairs, even requires further executive review and consultation
with interested parties of certain substantial agency rulemaking. See generally Steven Croley,
Wite House Review of Agenqy Rulemaking: An Empirical Investigation, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 821
(2003).
94. 366 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 2004).
95. Thai v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 967 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (Kozinski,J., dissenting).
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tailored to allay the Supreme Court's constitutional doubts"96 : only a
narrow subset of removable noncitizens-those mentally ill, violent
criminal noncitizens who are "likely to engage in acts of violence in the
future" and for whom "[n]o conditions of release can reasonably be
expected to ensure the safety of the public" 97-are subject to continued
detention. In addition, the regulations provide ample procedural
protections, including required mental health evaluations, a preliminary
and then plenary hearing before an immigration judge, rights to examine
witnesses and evidence, and further appellate review and periodic agency
re-review. Moreover, the government bears the burden to prove, by clear
and convincing evidence, that the noncitizen merits continued detention. 98
The dissent noted that "[t]he Court said nothing about how the statute is to
be construed in situations where the alien is given the procedural
protections it found missing in Zadvydas."99
Judge Kozinski's argument foreshadowed the reasoning of the Supreme
Court's subsequent decision in Brand X:
There can be no doubt that, had the regulations been promulgated before
Zadvydas, they would have been upheld. In adopting the regulations, the
[Attorney General] drew upon a broad grant of regulatory authority, and the
statute itself-as written by Congress-clearly authorizes detention of aliens
beyond six months. Because the regulations obviate the constitutional doubts
expressed in Zadvydas, the reasons given by the Court in that opinion would
not have provided a basis for striking down the regulations. There is no
96. Id. at 970. Indeed, when developing these regulations, the Attorney General
explained that section 241.14 was created "to justify continued detention of a particular
alien because of special circumstances, of the sort discussed in the Supreme Court's decision
in Zadvydas, even though the alien's removal is not significantly likely in the reasonably
foreseeable future." Continued Detention of Aliens Subject to Final Orders of Removal, 66
Fed. Reg. 56,967, 56,968-69 (Nov. 14, 2001) (codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 241 (2010)); see also
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690-91 (2001) ("[W]e have upheld preventive detention
based on dangerousness only when limited to specially dangerous individuals and subject to
strong procedural protections .... In cases in which preventive detention is of potentially
indefinite duration, we have also demanded that the dangerousness rationale be accompanied
by some other special circumstance, such as mental illness, that helps to create the danger."
(citing Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997))). The Ninth Circuit panel rejected the
dissent's reliance on this language from Zadvydas:
The statement in Zadvydas that noncriminal detention by the Government is
permissible only in narrow nonpunitive circumstances was intended to illustrate what
the Government is generally prohibited from doing, and what it may in some
circumstances be permitted to do. It did not state what the Government is authorized
to do under § 123 1(a)(6).
Thai, 366 F.3d at 795.
97. 8 C.F.R. § 241.14() (2011).
98. Thai, 389 F.3d at 970 (Kozinski,J., dissenting).
99. Id.
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legitimate reason the result should be different just because the [Attorney
General] promulgated the regulations after Zadvydas.1
00
To hold otherwise, as the panel did, Judge Kozinski argued:
[I]mplicates important separation of powers principles.... Given the
plenary authority of the political branches in the field of immigration, the
judiciary must be particularly careful not to cut off the [Attorney General's]
earnest effort to fulfill the function entrusted to him by Congress within
constitutional limits. The panel's opinion takes the opposite approach,
perversely leaving the [Attorney General], when acting pursuant to authority
expressly granted to him by Congress, with fewer powers to detain
undocumented aliens who are mentally disturbed and dangerous than the
states have in detaining dangerous U.S. citizens. 10 1
Four years later, in Tran v. Mukasgy, the Fifth Circuit joined the Ninth
Circuit in striking down the continued detention regulations.l0 2 Unlike the
Ninth Circuit in Thai v. Ashcroft, the Fifth Circuit decided this case after the
Supreme Court issued its Brand X decision. The government, however, did
not rely on or even cite Brand X and instead argued that the court should
adopt the reasoning in Judge Kozinski's Thai dissent.103 The Fifth Circuit
rejected that argument as foreclosed by Zadvydas and Clark because those
two Supreme Court precedents had construed away any ambiguity in the
statute. 104
Later that year, in Hernandez-Carrera v. Carlson, the Tenth Circuit reached
the opposite conclusion by applying Brand X to allow the agency's
continued detention regulations to stand. L0 5  This case involved two
petitioners who had sought habeas relief for their continued (and
100. Id.; see also Hernandez-Carrera v. Carlson, 547 F.3d 1237, 1248 (10th Cir. 2008)
('Judge Kozinski, dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc in Thai, anticipated Brand X to
reach a conclusion similar to that which we reach today."), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1011
(2009).
101. Thai, 389 F.3d at 971 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (citing Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S.
118, 123 (1967)).
102. 515 F.3d 478, 485 (5th Cir. 2008).
103. Id. at 483.
104. Id. at 484 ("The Supreme Court has twice held that § 123 1(a)(6) does not authorize
indefinite detention for any class of aliens covered by the statute. We are bound by the
statutory construction put forward in Zadvydas and Clark. Accordingly, 8 C.F.R. § 241.14,
which was enacted under the authority of § 123 1(a)(6), cannot authorize Tran's indefinite
detention." (citing Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298 (1994)). As discussed
more fully below, the Fifth Circuit's conclusion is in tension with the Brand X Court's holding
that "[o]nly a judicial precedent holding that the statute unambiguously forecloses the
agency's interpretation, and therefore contains no gap for the agency to fill, displaces a
conflicting agency construction." Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet
Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982-83 (2005).
105. Hernandez-Carrera, 547 F.3d at 1242.
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apparently indefinite) detention pending removal. Likely because of the
petitioners' criminal history, the government had been unable to find a
country that was willing to accept them. One petitioner, for instance, had
been convicted of sexually assaulting a seven-year-old boy and had
admitted to involvement in several hundred pedophilic contacts with
children in Cuba and in the United States. While in custody, he was
diagnosed with pedophilia. The other petitioner had been diagnosed with
schizophrenia and had been convicted of battery and indecent exposure
before being detained by the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS). While in INS custody, the petitioners were examined by mental
health professionals and deemed especially dangerous. After being
provided the procedural protections set forth in the continued detention
regulations, an immigration judge concluded that there were no reasonable
conditions of release that could reasonably be expected to ensure the safety
of the public and thus ordered continued detention for both petitioners.
106
The district court, like the Fifth and Ninth Circuits, found the continued
detention regulations to be ultra vires and granted the petitioners' writs of
habeas corpus. 107 The Tenth Circuit reversed. Writing for the panel,
Judge McConnell explained that the court had to answer two questions:
WIn order to determine whether the Attorney General's construction of 8
U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) warrants deference, notwithstanding the Supreme
Court's contrary construction of the statute in Zadvydas and [Clark v.]
Martinez, we must ask: 1) whether "the statute is silent or ambiguous" as to
the Attorney General's authority to detain certain categories of aliens beyond
the ninety day removal period; and 2) whether the agency's construction of
the statute represents a "permissible reading of the statute." 10 8
After concluding that the statute was ambiguous, the court held that the
agency's construction was a permissible reading of the statute for three
reasons.
First, the court found the agency's construction permissible because "the
substantive limitations built into the Attorney General's power to detain
aliens beyond the removal period, as well as the procedural protections
provided in such cases, are sufficient to satisfy due process," and thus "the
agency's construction of § 1231 (a)(6) no longer raises serious constitutional
106. See id. at 1242-44 (providing background on the two petitioners).
107. Hernandez-Carrera v. Carlson, 546 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1189 (D. Kan. 2008) ("The
court finds no meaningful way to distinguish the facts and circumstances of the two
remaining petitioners in the present case from the petitioners in Tuan Thai and Tran, and
thus adopts and incorporates the reasoning of those courts and reaches the same
conclusion."), vacated and remanded, 547 F.3d 1237 (10th Cir. 2008).
108. Hernandez-Carrera, 547 F.3d at 1244-45.
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doubts."'10 9 As Judge Kozinski had previously observed, the court found
that the procedural protections established by the regulations avoid all of
the constitutional concerns identified in Zadvydas (and Clark). 110
Second, the Tenth Circuit rejected the petitioners' argument that "the
Supreme Court's construction of § 1231(a)(6) in Zadvydas and Martinez
forecloses any subsequent, contrary interpretation by the Attorney
General.""' The court explained that the Fifth and Ninth Circuits'
contrary conclusions could not be squared with Brand X, which reaffirmed
the holding "in Chevron that 'ambiguities in statutes within an agency's
jurisdiction to administer are delegations of authority to the agency to fill
the statutory gap in reasonable fashion."' l2 The court further explained
that "[]udicial deference to administrative interpretations in these cases is
not a policy choice, but rather a means of giving effect to congressional
intent. ' 13 Accordingly, under Brand X it did not matter that the judicial
interpretation preceded the agency's interpretation; to hold otherwise
"would be ignoring Congress' choice to empower an agency, rather than
the courts, to resolve this kind of statutory ambiguity."' 14 Moreover, the
court rejected the petitioners' argument, perhaps first articulated by Justice
Stevens in his concurring opinion in Brand X, that the Brand X rule "would
not necessarily be applicable to a decision by [the Supreme Court] that
would presumably remove any pre-existing ambiguity.""15  The Tenth
109. Id. at 1251.
110. Id. at 1253; see id. at 1253-56 (discussing at length the adequacy of the procedural
protections and otherwise rejecting petitioners' due process claims).
111. Id. at1246.




115. Id. at 1247 (alteration in original) (quoting Brand X, 545 U.S. at 1003 (Stevens, J.,
concurring)). As the Tenth Circuit noted, Justice Stevens may have been referring to a
ruling that a statute was unambiguous. Id. At least one commentator, as the court also
noted, has argued that Justice Stevens was reserving a Chevron veto power for the Supreme
Court. See id.; Kathryn A. Watts, Adapting to Administrative Law's Erie Doctrine, 101 Nw. U. L.
REV. 997, 1000 n.19 (2007) ("[O]ne Justice (Stevens) took the view that agencies should be
able to trump lower court interpretations but not necessarily Supreme Court
interpretations."). Indeed, a student note commenting on the Tenth Circuit's opinion
argues that the relevant Supreme Court precedent had foreclosed the Tenth Circuit's
holding and proposes a three-factor test for determining when the Brand X rule should be
applied to Supreme Court precedent. See Brandon L. Phillips, Note, Questioning the Supremacy
of the Supreme Court: Hernandez-Carrera v. Carlson and the Tenth Circuit's Justification for
Indefinite Detention under the Brand X Framework, 96 IOWA L. REv. 1099, 1121-23 (2011) ("(1)
whether the statute was intended to limit agency action; (2) whether the statute inherently
involves, or could lead to, significant constitutional issues; and (3) whether the judicial
interpretation was intended to foreclose alternative agency interpretations.").
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Circuit held that Brand X made no such exception and that such an
exception would be contrary to the administrative law principles articulated
in Chevron and Brand X.
Third, and most relevant for the purposes of this Article, the Tenth
Circuit "address[ed] whether, and in what manner, an agency's interpretive
discretion is constrained by the canon of constitutional avoidance.""l 6 The
petitioners had argued that constitutional avoidance "trumps" Chevron,
whereas the government had argued that constitutional avoidance never
precludes an agency's interpretation of a statute when Chevron deference is
otherwise appropriate. The court held that "the answer is in between""l
7:
constitutional avoidance does not trump an agency's interpretation of an
ambiguous statute it administers if the interpretation is reasonable and
avoids serious constitutional doubts. In reaching this conclusion, the court
explained that "[i]t is well established that the canon of constitutional
avoidance does constrain an agency's discretion to interpret statutory
ambiguities, even when Chevron deference would otherwise be due.
' l 18
After reviewing the relevant Supreme Court precedent, the Tenth Circuit
concluded:
[E]ven after a court has construed a statute to avoid constitutional doubts, an
agency remains free to interpret the same statute in a different manner so
long as its subsequent interpretation is reasonable and avoids serious
constitutional questions. A court's prior judicial construction of a statute,
applying the avoidance canon, precludes an alternative agency construction
only when no alternative, reasonable construction would avoid constitutional
doubts. In that case the only "permissible" construction is the reading which
does not provoke a serious constitutional question. In the ordinary case,
however, courts should review a new agency interpretation afresh to
determine whether the agency's reading sufficiently avoids raising
constitutional doubts, such that it ought to be entitled to deference. 119
Because, as discussed above, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the
continued detention regulations avoided all constitutional issues, it upheld
116. Hernandez-Carrera, 547 F.3d at 1249.
117. Id. This approach appears analogous to the approach the Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit had previously adopted: "This canon of constitutional avoidance trumps
Chevron deference, and we will not submit to an agency's interpretation of a statute if it
'presents serious constitutional difficulties[.]' But we do not abandon Chevron deference at
the mere mention of a possible constitutional problem; the argument must be serious." Nat'l
Mining Ass'n v. Kempthorne, 512 F.3d 702, 711 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (citations omitted).
118. Hernandez-Carrera, 547 F.3d at 1249; see also id. at 1249-50 (citing Solid Waste
Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 172-73 (2001);
Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S.
568, 577 (1988)).
119. Id. at 1251.
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the regulations and thus reversed the habeas relief granted by the district
court.
Despite the fact that the Tenth Circuit's decision in Hernandez-Carrera
created a 2-1 circuit split,120 the Supreme Court denied further review.
121
The denial of certiorari review is not too surprising as the circuit split was
shallow and arguably could have resolved itself, as the Tenth Circuit
posited, 122 because neither the Fifth nor the Ninth Circuit considered Brand
X. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit-with respect to a different immigration
statute-appears to have recently adopted the same rule regarding
constitutional avoidance.123 The Tenth Circuit has also reaffirmed this rule
in a different context: "Even when a Supreme Court decision conflicts with
an agency's subsequent decision over the meaning of the same statute, we
must still defer to the agency's decision, so long as it is reasonable and
constitutional."' 124 To date, no other court of appeals has addressed the
continued-detention statute. 1
25
While the Tenth Circuit correctly recognized that constitutional
avoidance does not always trump Chevron deference, Judge McConnell did
not go far enough. As discussed in Part III, the court should have held that
avoidance plays no role under Chevron unless the court determines that the
agency's interpretation is not constitutional.
120. See Gillian E. Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law as Constitutional Common Law, 110
COLUM. L. REv. 479, 499 n.73 (2010) ("A circuit split currently exists on the question of
whether the government's new regulation qualifies for Chevron deference.").
121. Hernandez-Carrera v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1011 (2009).
122. Hernandez- Carrera, 547 F.3d at 1248 ("We are reassured in disagreeing with the Fifth
and Ninth Circuit by the fact that neither court considered the Supreme Court's Brand X
decision."), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1011 (2009).
123. See Dioufv. Napolitano, 634 F.3d 1081, 1090 (9th Cir. 2011) ("We may not defer to
[Department of Homeland Security] regulations interpreting § 1231(a)(6), however, if they
raise grave constitutional doubts.").
124. Olivan-Duenas v. Holder, 416 F. App'x 678, 680 n. I (10th Cir. 2011) (emphasis
omitted) (citing Hernandez-Carrera, 547 F.3d at 1242).
125. One district court has adopted the Tenth Circuit's reasoning. See Marquez-
Coromina v. Hollingsworth, 692 F. Supp. 2d 565, 574 (D. Md. 2010) ("The court finds the
reasoning of Hemandez-Carrera persuasive and will apply it to the near-identical facts of this
case. Accordingly, the court finds that 8 C.F.R. § 241.14(l)(1) is a reasonable interpretation
of 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) entitled to Chevron deference.").
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11. BRAND X PRINCIPLES OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Determining the role modern constitutional avoidance should play in the
review of administrative interpretations of law is, like the Chevron rule itself,
a two-step inquiry.
First, Part III.A explores whether modern avoidance should apply at
Chevron step one-i.e., whether a court should invoke modern avoidance to
construe away an ambiguity in the statute and thus not defer to the
agency's interpretation (even if the agency's interpretation is actually
constitutional). While, as discussed above, the Supreme Court's decisions
on this point are unclear, many lower courts and scholars have concluded
that modern avoidance trumps Chevron deference at step one. Part III.A
explains how the Court's reasoning in Brand X and its progeny have made
clear that modern avoidance should play no role at Chevron step one-a
conclusion that Judge McConnell and Professor Kenneth Bamberger have
similarly reached in the wake of Brand X.
Second, Part III.B explores the more difficult question-i.e., whether
modern avoidance should apply at Chevron step two as a reasonableness
check on agency action. In contrast to the conclusion reached by Judge
McConnell and Professor Bamberger, this Article concludes that modern
avoidance should play no role at Chevron step two. Such use of modern
avoidance would do serious violence to the separation of powers by
permitting a court's tentative constitutional determination to override a co-
equal branch's conclusion that an otherwise permissible interpretation of an
ambiguous statute comports with the Constitution. Part III.B explores both
the Article I and the Article II aspects of this separation of powers concern.
Part III.C then reframes the separation of power considerations through
the lens of Dean Rubin's network theory, which further clarifies why
modern avoidance should play no role in the review of administrative
interpretations of law.
A. Clark, Brand X, and Its Progeny: No Avoidance at Chevron Step One
The October Term of 2004 brought some clarity to the role of modern
avoidance in administrative law. First, in Clark v. Martinez, the Court
addressed the doctrine of modern constitutional avoidance.126 As discussed
above, Clark dealt with the same continued-detention statute the Court had
interpreted three years earlier in Zadvydas.127 (In neither case was the Court
considering an agency's interpretation that was owed Chevron deference.)
There, the Court invoked modern avoidance to limit the government's
126. 543 U.S. 371 (2005).
127. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
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detention powers over removable noncitizens128 to the time period
"reasonably necessary" to remove the noncitizens from the country. 129 The
government had been detaining certain noncitizens indefinitely, even when
it knew removal was not reasonably foreseeable because no country was
willing to accept the noncitizens. The Zadvydas Court established a six-
month presumptively reasonable detention period after which the
noncitizen would have to be released back into the United States if there
was "no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable
future."1
30
Clark presented the same question but with respect to inadmissible
noncitizens. The Zadvydas Court had noted that, because inadmissible
noncitizens enjoy less constitutional protections than admitted noncitizens,
those "who have not yet gained initial admission to this country would
present a very different question." 131 Notwithstanding these differences, the
Court applied the same limitations on both groups because "[t]he operative
language of [8 U.S.C.] § 1231 (a)(6), 'may be detained beyond the removal
period,' applies without differentiation to all three categories of aliens that
are its subject." 132  In so holding, the Court clarified that the modern
doctrine of constitutional avoidance "is a tool for choosing between
competing plausible interpretations of a statutory text, resting on the
reasonable presumption that Congress did not intend the alternative which
raises serious constitutional doubts." 33 It is not "a method of adjudicating
constitutional questions by other means"; it is "a means of giving effect to
congressional intent, not of subverting it."134 In sum, "The canon of
constitutional avoidance comes into play only when, after the application of
ordinary textual analysis, the statute is found to be susceptible of more than
one construction; and the canon functions as a means of choosing between
128. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) (2006) ("An alien ordered removed who is inadmissible
under section 1182 of this title, removable under section 1227(a)(1)(C), 1227(a)(2), or
1227(a)(4) of this title or who has been determined by the Attorney General to be a risk to
the community or unlikely to comply with the order of removal, may be detained beyond
the [ninety-day] removal period .... ).
129. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 689, 699.
130. Id. at 701.
131. Id. at682.
132. Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 378 (2005). This statutory scheme is discussed in
more detail in Part I, infra.
133. Clark, 543 U.S. at 381-82 (citing Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 191 (1991);
Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S.
568, 575 (1988)).
134. Id. at 381-82 (citing NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 502 (1979);




Later that Term, in Brand X, the Court reaffirmed the general Chevron
rule: "If a statute is ambiguous, and if the implementing agency's
construction is reasonable, Chevron requires a federal court to accept the
agency's construction of the statute, even if the agency's reading differs
from what the court believes is the best statutory interpretation." 136 That is
because "ambiguities in statutes within an agency's jurisdiction to
administer are delegations of authority to the agency to fill the statutory gap
in a reasonable fashion."' 13 7 The Brand X Court took this principle one step
further. The Ninth Circuit below had refused to accord Chevron deference
because it had already construed the same provision of the
Communications Act in a conflicting manner. It thus held that the
administrative interpretation offered by the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) was foreclosed by that prior precedent. 138  The
Supreme Court reversed. It held that "[o]nly a judicial precedent holding
that the statute unambiguously forecloses the agency's interpretation, and
therefore contains no gap for the agency to fill, displaces a conflicting
agency construction."1
39
In other words, once the court has identified such an ambiguity, there is
a "presumption" that Congress "desired the agency (rather than the courts)
to possess whatever degree of discretion the ambiguity allows"-regardless
of any prior judicial interpretation. 40 Accordingly, under Chevron, an
administrative interpretation trumps a judicial one even if the judicial one
came first:
Since Chevron teaches that a court's opinion as to the best reading of an
ambiguous statute an agency is charged with administering is not
authoritative, the agency's decision to construe that statute differently from a
court does not say that the court's holding was legally wrong. Instead, the
agency may, consistent with the court's holding, choose a different
135. Id. at 385. The Clark Court divided 5-4, with Justice Thomas arguing in dissent,
inter alia, that the majority had distorted the modern constitutional avoidance doctrine by
adopting a "lowest common denominator" approach-i.e., asking whether an interpretation
would raise constitutional doubts for third parties not before the court (instead of just
focusing on petitioners). Compare id. at 392-401 (Thomas, J., dissenting), with id. at 380-83
(majority opinion). See also supra note 29 (discussing this further extension of modern
constitutional avoidance).
136. Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980
(2005) (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44
& n.ll (1984)).
137. Id.
138. ld. at 982.
139. Id. at 982-83.
140. Id. at 982 (quoting Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 740-41 (1996)).
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construction, since the agency remains the authoritative interpreter (within
the limits of reason) of such statutes.
141
Justice Scalia dissented, predicting that the "wonderful new world that
the Court creates" is "one full of promise for administrative-law professors
in need of tenure articles and, of course, for litigators."' 42 He accused the
majority of creating a "breathtaking novelty: judicial decisions subject to
reversal by executive officers." 143  This new rule, he argued, is
unconstitutional as it forces courts to issue advisory opinions. 144 The Court
dismissed this accusation, noting that the judicial "precedent has not been
'reversed' by the agency, any more than a federal court's interpretation of a
State's law can be said to have been 'reversed' by a state court that adopts a
conflicting (yet authoritative) interpretation of state law."'
145
The analogy between federal courts construing state law and federal
statutes administered by agencies became more apt in light of the Court's
subsequent decision in Negusie v. Holder.146 There, the Court was asked to
consider whether the agency's interpretation of a persecutor bar to asylum
relief was owed Chevron deference. The agency had interpreted the
statutory provision to require denial of asylum to any otherwise qualifying
noncitizen if he had persecuted others in his native countryI47-regardless
of whether that participation in persecution was voluntary. 148 The Court
concluded that Chevron deference did not apply because the agency had
misread prior Supreme Court precedent and erroneously concluded it was
bound by that precedent at Chevron step one.
In other words, the agency had not exercised any discretion to which
141. Id. at 983. The majority opinion was joined in full by six members of the Court,
with Justices Scalia, Souter, and Ginsburg dissenting. Justices Stevens and Breyer both filed
concurring opinions. In a brief concurrence, Justice Stevens emphasized that the Brand X
trumping power "would not necessarily be applicable to a decision by this Court that would
presumably remove any pre-existing ambiguity." Id. at 1003 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Justice Breyer's concurrence took issue with an unrelated fight with respect to the deference
owed under United States v. Mead Corp., 553 U.S. 218 (2001). See Brand X, 545 U.S. at 1003-
05 (Breyer,J., concurring).
142. BrandX, 545 U.S. at 1019 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
143. Id. at 1016.
144. See id. at 1017-19 & nn. 12-13 (noting that an agency will be able to disregard a
prior construction of a statute espoused by the Court and seek Chevron deference for its
contrary construction in another case).
145. Id. at 983-84 (majority opinion).
146. 555 U.S. 511 (2009).
147. 8 U.S.C. §110 1(a)(42) (2006) ("The term 'refugee' does not include any person who
ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of any person on
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.").
148. Negusie, 555 U.S. at 514.
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Chevron deference would apply. Instead of reaching the question itself,
14 9
however, the Court remanded the question to the agency to consider in the
first instance:
Having concluded that the [Board of Immigration Appeals] has not yet
exercised its Chevron discretion to interpret the statute in question, "the proper
course, except in rare circumstances, is to remand to the agency for
additional investigation or explanation." This remand rule exists, in part,
because "ambiguities in statutes within an agency's jurisdiction to administer
are delegations of authority to the agency to fill the statutory gap in
reasonable fashion. Filling these gaps. .. involves difficult policy choices that
agencies are better equipped to make than courts."
' 150
If an agency has not had an opportunity to exercise its Chevron discretion
with respect to an ambiguous provision of the statute it administers, Negusie
instructs that the ordinary course is for the court to remand the question to
the agency. This application of the ordinary remand rule is strikingly
similar to the practice of federal courts certifying state-law statutory
interpretation questions to state supreme courts when they are questions of
first impression. 151
Negusie is significant here for an additional reason: Justice Scalia
concurred in the outcome. Signaling perhaps a step back from his dissent
in Brand X, Justice Scalia agreed that the agency should have the first
149. Justice Stevens wrote separately to argue that the Court should have reached the
question itself as the question is one of law to which the agency should receive no deference.
Id. at 538 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Thomas dissented,
arguing that the statute unambiguously precludes any inquiry into whether the persecutor
acted voluntarily. Id. at 542 (Thomas,J, dissenting).
150. Id. at 528 (majority opinion) (alteration in original) (quoting Gonzales v. Thomas,
547 U.S. 183, 186 (2006) (per curiam); Brand X, 545 U.S. at 980).
151. See, e.g., Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 391 (1974) ("[Certification] does, of
course, in the long run save time, energy, and resources and helps build a cooperative
judicial federalism."). See generally Rebecca A. Cochran, Federal Court Certification of Questions of
State Law to State Courts: A Theoretical and Empirical Study, 29J. LEGIS. 157 (2003) (discussing the
certification process by looking at Ohio courts). Professor Watts has taken this approach one
step further and suggested an "interactive" approach where courts informally consult with
the relevant agency when an action between two private parties involves an ambiguous
statute the agency administers. See Watts, supra note 115, at 1025-47.
The Court has since reached a similar conclusion in a somewhat analogous context
in Conkright v. Frommert. 130 S. Ct. 1640 (2010). There, the Court rejected the 'one-strike-
and-you're-out' approach" in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
context and held that a court must apply the traditional deferential standard of review to an
ERISA plan administrator's determination, even if the court had found a previous related
interpretation by the administrator to be invalid. Id. at 1646-47, 1651-52. In other words,
like the agency in Brand X, the Court appeared to hold in Conkright that a plan
administrator's subsequent interpretation may trump a prior judicial interpretation of an
ambiguous provision.
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opportunity to construe the statute: "It is to agency officials, not to the
Members of this Court, that Congress has given discretion to choose among
permissible interpretations of the statute." 152 In other words, it seems that,
forJustice Scalia, an agency is only out of luck when a court has weighed in
on a statute before Negusie applied the Ventura ordinary remand rule to
Chevron questions or when a court decides extraordinary circumstances
justify departing from that ordinary remand rule. Agency officials, in
Justice Scalia's view, "deserve to be told clearly whether we are serious
about allowing them to exercise that discretion."' 153
Whatever the effect ofJustice Scalia's concurrence in Negusie on his Brand
X dissent, the juxtaposition of the opinions in Clark and Brand X (and Negusie)
leads to a natural (though unstated) conclusion: modern avoidance plays no
role at Chevron step one because it "functions as a means of choosing
between" various interpretations, 154 whereas "Chevron requires a federal
court to accept the agency's construction of the statute, even if the agency's
reading differs from what the court believes is the best statutory
interpretation."' 155 After all, Brand X held that "[o]nly a judicial precedent
holding that the statute unambiguously forecloses the agency's
interpretation, and therefore contains no gap for the agency to fill, displaces
a conflicting agency construction."' 156  And modern avoidance, by
definition, is not implicated unless the statute does not unambiguously
foreclose an interpretation that raises constitutional questions. Just as a
reasonable agency interpretation trumps prior judicial precedent per Brand
X, a court cannot trump a reasonable interpretation by an the agency, who
is the "authoritative interpreter"'157 of the statute it administers, by invoking
constitutional avoidance at Chevron step one.
B. Brand X and Separation of Powers: No Modem Avoidance
at Chevron Step Two
After Brand X, the more difficult question is whether modern avoidance
plays any role at Chevron step two. As discussed, Judge McConnell, writing
152. Negusie, 129 S. Ct. at 1170 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Antonin Scalia, Judicial
Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DuKE LJ. 511, 516 (describing Chevron
deference as "an across-the-board presumption that, in the case of an ambiguity, agency
discretion is meant").
153. Negusie, 129 S. Ct. at 1170.
154. Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 385 (2005) (emphasis omitted).
155. Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980
(2005) (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44
& n.Il (1984)).
156. Id. at982-83.
157. Id. at 983.
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for the Tenth Circuit in Hernandez-Carrera, held that it does: "the only
'permissible' construction is the reading which does not provoke a serious
constitutional question."1 58 Like Judge McConnell, Professor Bamberger
agrees that, after Brand X, constitutional avoidance cannot apply at Chevron
step one because "applying normative canons wholesale to statutory
construction (whether characterized as formal step-one analysis or the
functionally equivalent independent judicial judgment) would exceed the
legitimate scope of judicial authority to interpret regulatory statutes."
159
Instead, modern avoidance should inform whether an agency's
interpretation is reasonable at Chevron step two.
This approach, he argues, "can order decisionmaking to resolve
important issues before they reach the judiciary" and "can induce agencies
to engage their institutional strengths more fully" by incorporating
normative concerns in policymaking in the first instance.160 In other words,
it is proper to apply modem avoidance at Chevron step two because the
second step is concerned with normative policy judgments. This argument
echoes Professor Gillian Metzger's observation that "[d]ecisions applying
the constitutional avoidance canon to agency-administered statutes create
similar incentives for agencies to take constitutional concerns seriously."'
16 1
Indeed, Professor Bamberger argues that "[i]ncorporating normative
canons [including modern avoidance] into the step-two reasonableness
inquiry seems the only way to reconcile those tools' continued use in
judicial review with Brand X's rule."' 62 Judge McConnell's and Professor
Bamberger's careful approach has intuitive appeal and appears to be the
most plausible way to find a place for modern constitutional avoidance
within the Chevron framework. 163  And their approach addresses the
158. Hernandez-Carrera v. Carlson, 547 F.3d 1237, 1251 (10th Cir. 2008), cert. denied,
130 S. Ct. 1011 (2009).
159. Bamberger, supra note 14, at 106.
160. Id. at 111.
161. Metzger, supra note 120, at 499; accord Trevor W. Morrison, ConstitutionalAvoidance in
the Executive Branch, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1189, 1197 (2006) ("[I]f the reviewing court would
predictably use a particular canon when construing the statute, then the agency has a
tactical incentive to apply the canon even if the values supporting it apply only to the
judiciary."). Professor Morrison's article aptly explores in more detail the Executive's
independent and somewhat distinctive use of constitutional avoidance in executing the law.
See also Jerry L. Mashaw, Norms, Practices, and the Paradox of Deference: A Preliminary Inquiry into
Agency Statutory Interpretation, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 501 (2005); H. Jefferson Powell, The Executive
and the Avoidance Canon, 81 IND. LJ. 1313 (2006).
162. Bamberger, supra note 14, at 114.
163. Professor Bamberger's approach also underscores the importance of preserving the
two-step approach to Chevron deference-an approach that has increasingly come under fire
by scholars. See, e.g., Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One
Step, 95 VA. L. REV. 597 (2009).
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concerns raised in Part II.B regarding comparative institutional strengths,
in that an agency is afforded the first opportunity to address the
constitutional questions in a statute it administers.
But, in attempting to avoid potential constitutional questions in
administrative law, the approach creates actual constitutional problems. If
modern avoidance were applied at step two, a court's identification of
potential constitutional concerns with one plausible interpretation could
supplant an agency's adoption of that interpretation-even if, in the end,
the agency's interpretation passed constitutional muster. 164 Not only would.
that discount the Clark Court's admonition that "[t]he canon is not a
method of adjudicating constitutional questions by other means," 165 it
would do serious violence to the separation of powers among co-equal
branches of government. The violence modern avoidance causes to the
separation of powers between Congress and the Judiciary has been well
chronicled in the literature. But in the administrative context, this violence
extends to the separation of powers between the Executive and the
Judiciary. After all, the President has the constitutional duty to "take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed."'166 And, as the Supreme Court has
observed, "Interpreting a law enacted by Congress to implement the
legislative mandate is the very essence of 'execution' of the law." 
167
As Professor William Kelley explains, modern avoidance strips the
Executive of that constitutional authority:
[W]henever the Court denies the Executive its preferred statutory reading on
avoidance grounds, the practical effect is for the Court to dictate how the
laws shall be executed, or, more precisely, how they shall not be. That
arrogation by the Court creates the serious potential of violating Article II by
displacing the President as the executor of the laws.1
68
In so doing, the court also "ignores the fact that the Executive has an
independent and constitutionally mandated role in the discernment and
articulation of constitutional meaning in connection with its execution of
the laws."' 169 Indeed, by displacing the Executive's interpretation with its
own, the court removes any political accountability for those policy
judgments. The Chevron Court found such accountability to be critical,
noting that "federal judges-who have no constituency-have a duty to
respect legitimate policy choices made by those who do."' 170 Such political
164. See Vermeule, supra note 5, at 1960-61.
165. Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 381 (2005).
166. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
167. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 733 (1986).
168. Kelley, supra note 4, at 883.
169. Id. at 881.
170. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984).
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accountability is of heightened importance in the modern avoidance
context, where, in the court's judgment, the Executive has interpreted a
statute to approach (though perhaps not exceed) constitutional limits.
Indeed, applying modern avoidance to an agency's interpretation of an
ambiguous statute it administers frustrates the careful balance of powers
between all three branches, as it was Congress in the first place that
charged the Executive to interpret and implement the statute.171 It does
not appear that the Court has ever explicitly identified these constitutional
effects of the modern avoidance canon. 172 It is worth noting, however, that
the Court's wording of the Chevron rule hints that this separation of powers
concern may have been at least an implicit factor: "Congress, when it left
ambiguity in a statute meant for implementation by an agency, understood
that the ambiguity would be resolved, first and foremost, by the agency,
and desired the agency (rather than the courts) to possess whatever degree
of discretion the ambiguity allows."' 173 To the extent the Court has not
previously recognized this problem, it could serve as a compelling
justification to clear up the confusion created by DeBartolo, Solid Waste
Agency, and Rust.
Moreover, while the Court has not explicitly recognized the separation
of powers concerns that modern avoidance pose for the Executive, it has
suggested that the canon plays no role at Chevron step two. Indeed, far from
giving this interpretative canon Chevron-displacing force, the Court has
suggested that it is a helpful guidepost for courts, not a binding rule of
interpretation on the Executive. In Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., the
Court explained that its invocation of the avoidance canon in Clark "simply
informed the choice among plausible readings of § 1231(a)(6)'s text."' 174
The Court drew a sharp distinction between the canon and what it called
"implied limitations on otherwise unambiguous [text]." Such "implied
limitations" include, the Court explained, the presumptions that, absent a
clear statement, statutes do not apply extraterritorially or impose monetary
liability on states.175
In other words, the difference between the modem avoidance doctrine
171. Kelley, supra note 4, at 872-73 ("The defects in the operation of the avoidance
canon are particularly clear in the Chevron context, perhaps because the Executive has a
congressional delegation of power behind its statutory interpretation. The DeBartolo Corp.
rule, in other words, pits the Court not only against the Executive, but also against the
congressional allocation of law-elaboration authority to the Executive.").
172. See id. at 869 (mentioning the Court's failure to "take[ ] note of these effects of the
avoidance canon").
173. Smileyv. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 740-41 (1996).
174. 545 U.S. 119, 140 (2005).
175. Id. at 139.
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and clear statement rules "is the distinction between a canon for choosing
among plausible meanings of an ambiguous statute and a clear statement
rule that implies a special substantive limit on the application of an
otherwise unambiguous mandate."17 6  These latter sorts of implied,
substantive limitations could well constrain agency discretion, just as the
presumption against retroactivity limited agency discretion in Bowen v.
Georgetown University Hospital.'77 By contrast, the mere possibility that a
textually plausible interpretation of an ambiguous statute might present
constitutional concerns in no way detracts from "Chevron's premise" that "it
is for agencies, not courts, to fill statutory gaps."'
178
Indeed, scholars have warned that the importation of normative canons
into the Chevron framework would impermissibly strip an agency of its
congressionally delegated law-elaboration authority. Professor Adrian
Vermeule, for instance, has argued that judicial reliance on the "rich brew
of judge-made canons and collateral sources" would "read[ ] agency
deference out of the picture by narrowing agencies' gap-filling power to the
residual area in which judicial tools run out."' 179 Accordingly, he has
counseled that, unless Congress "clearly says otherwise," courts should not
employ any tools for resolving ambiguity but should defer to agency
determinations regarding these normative values in policymaking. 180
Similarly, Professors Tom Merrill and Kristin Hickman have underscored
that not only does modern avoidance undermine congressional delegation
of difficult policy choices to the Executive; it "has the opposite effect of
enlarging the scope of policymaking by courts at the expense of Congress
and the agencies."' 8' Another commentator has likewise noted that the
"danger in applying substantive canons in Step Two is that it may lead to
excessive discretion on the part of judges and defeat the purposes of
Chevron." 182
The main response to this argument appears to be two-fold. First, there
is the argument that the threat of modern avoidance at Chevron step two
creates incentives for agencies to take constitutional concerns seriously.
Second, applying modern avoidance in the Chevron framework may help to
prevent the "vetogates" problem: "The obvious consequence of the
176. Id. at 141.
177. 488 U.S. 204, 213-14 (1988).
178. Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Ser's., 545 U.S. 967, 982
(2005).
179. ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY
OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 206 (2006).
180. Id. at 201.
181. Merrill & Hickman, supra note 19, at 915.
182. Greenfield, supra note 67, at 53.
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vetogates structure is that federal statutes are hard to enact.... If vetogates
make statutes hard to enact, they make them doubly hard to repeal."'183 In
other words, modern avoidance allows courts to avoid repealing statutes
while preserving congressional intent to the greatest extent possible.
A closer examination of these arguments, however, reveals that neither is
compelling in the administrative context. As to the former, all three
branches of government have a duty to act within constitutional limits. But
no branch has the constitutionally mandated duty to avoid constitutional
questions. Nor does the Judiciary have the power to require another
branch to avoid constitutional questions. As Professor Kelley explains,
"Such treatment of a coordinate branch not only shows a lack of inter-
branch comity, it positively turns Marbuy v. Madison on its head."'184 By
contrast, the threat of applying classical constitutional avoidance at Chevron
step two should be sufficient to ensure that the Executive fulfills its
constitutional duty to interpret statutes within actual constitutional limits.
Moreover, the utility of normative canons like modern avoidance as
"democracy-forcing rules" has been called into question due to their
inability to affect congressional behavior.185 Similar concerns apply to their
ability to promote administrative deliberation, and it is doubtful that the
benefits of any such deliberation would outweigh the increased decision
costs186 and unpredictable results that follow from allowing courts to apply
modern avoidance to set aside otherwise reasonable agency
interpretations. 1
87
For similar reasons, proscribing-not prescribing-modern avoidance at
Chevron step two actually assists in preventing the vetogates problem. Unlike
Congress, agencies can respond more easily and swiftly to a court's
invalidation of an agency's interpretation of a statute on constitutional
grounds "because, burdensome though administrative procedures can be,
they do not involve the same types of 'vetogates' entailed in getting
legislation through Congress and signed by the President."' 188 If the
183. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REv.
1441, 1448, 1453 (2008). It must be noted that Professor Eskridge did not argue that his
vetogates framework encourages or discourages the use of modern constitutional avoidance
in administrative law.
184. Kelley, supra note 4, at 868 (footnote omitted).
185. VERMEULE, supra note 179, at 198.
186. See id. at 215 ("The interpretive complexity shunted out of the judiciary would be
managed at a lower cost by agencies.").
187. See id. at 209 ("Only a kind of blind confidence in judicial capacities could suggest
that judges are systematically superior to agency administrators in determining what
legislators intended, or what purposes an enacting majority meant to pursue, or what policy
tradeoffs the statute made.").
188. Metzger, supra note 120, at 532.
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agency's interpretation is struck down as unconstitutional, under Brand X
the agency will be given another chance to construe the statute in a
constitutional manner. The statute itself remains unaffected; there would
be no legislative vetogates through which to jump. Utilizing modern
avoidance to avoid striking down an agency's interpretation thus fails to
advance the doctrine's main purpose: to prevent the statute from being
struck down as unconstitutional. Perhaps for this reason, Professor Metzger
has observed that "a partial remand of an agency decision does not pose
the same danger of overturning careful political compromises as does
application of the canon of avoidance."'
189
In all events, even if the prudential benefits of applying modern
avoidance at Chevron step two outweighed their costs, which they do not, the
separation of powers concerns discussed above would counsel against-if
not outright prohibit-such an application. 190 Instead, under a Brand X
189. Id. at 533.
190. The political accountability concerns that motivate, in part, traditional separation
of powers theory bear a striking resemblance to popular constitutionalism, in that judicial
review historically was (and should continue to be) "a power to be employed cautiously, only
where the unconstitutionality of a law was clear beyond doubt." LARRY D. KRAMER, THE
PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM ANDJUDIcIAL REVIEW 99 (2004); see
also MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999);
Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE LJ. 1346, 1353 (2006)
(arguing for a similarly narrow definition of judicial review but limiting the scope of the
article to 'judicial review of legislation, not judicial review of executive action or
administrative decisionmaking"). As Dean Larry Kramer has meticulously chronicled and
argued, judicial review historically began "as a 'political-legal' act, a substitute for popular
resistance, required by the people's command to ignore laws that were ultra vires-though
only when the unconstitutionality of a law was clear beyond dispute." KRAMER, supra, at 92.
It was not until "the past generation or so," Dean Kramer explains, that "[c]onstitutional
history was recast-turned on its head, really-as a story of judicial triumphalism. A
judicial monopoly on constitutional interpretation is now depicted as inexorable and
inevitable." Id. at 229. Popular constitutionalism thus counsels a return to the historically
limited role of judicial review and the elimination of the notion of judicial supremacy in
constitutional interpretation: "That means publicly repudiating Justices who say that they,
not we, possess ultimate authority to say what the Constitution means"; "Above all, it means
insisting that the Supreme Court is our servant and not our master." Id. at 247-48. In sum,
"The Supreme Court is not the highest authority in the land on constitutional law. We are."
ld. at 248.
Note how modern avoidance turns popular constitutionalism on its head, from a
theory of judicial review that required no doubt concerning unconstitutionality to one that
allows reconstruction of a statute where there is merely any doubt of constitutionali!y. To be
sure, the Framers did not envision the administrative state we have today, and constitutional
avoidance-even in its classical form-did not appear until the 1800s. But popular
constitutionalism naturally supports a Brand X doctrine of avoidance. The Judiciary does
not, and historically has not, had a monopoly on interpreting the Constitution. Nor,
certainly, does popular constitutionalism's limited formulation of judicial review encompass
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doctrine of constitutional avoidance, the only avoidance doctrine that
should apply in the Chevron analysis is the classical form-i.e., an agency has
the obligation to adopt a constitutional interpretation of an ambiguous
statute it administers, and a court should strike down an agency's
interpretation as impermissible if it is actually unconstitutional.
C. Separation of Powers Revisited Under Network Theory
These separation of powers considerations are perhaps better understood
under Dean Rubin's network theory of government. Some explanation of
the theory is required. In Bgyond Camelot, Dean Rubin explains that
traditional theories of American government fail to fully account for the
role of the modern administrative state; instead, they "represent a mixture
of the political thought of the Middle Ages and the political fantasies of that
era, in particular the legend of Camelot."' 191 Accordingly, theories of
American government must be recalibrated to align with the reality of the
expansive role of the modern administrative state. 192 To reconstruct the
proper structure of American government, Dean Rubin embarks on a
quasi-Cartesian thought experiment of "bracketing" traditional concepts
used to describe American government.
First and foremost, Dean Rubin discards the traditional "branches of
government" metaphor because it fails on numerous levels to capture the
structure and relationship of American government. 19 3  The modern
administrative state is not merely a subbranch of the Executive Branch.
Some independent agencies are not even located in that branch; most
agencies were created by the Legislative Branch, and the agencies have
their roots in all aspects of the modern state. Nor is the accompanying
the power to strike down a politically accountable branch's interpretation of legislation on
the ground that the construction raises constitutional doubts. To the contrary, such a broad
view of judicial review finds no historical support. By removing the weight of judicial
supremacy, as popular constitutionalists advocate, "a different equilibrium [will] emerge, as
a risk-averse and potentially vulnerable Court adjusts its behavior to greater sensitivity on
the part of political leadership in the other branches." Id. at 253. This change in "the
Justices' attitudes and self-conception as they went about their routine," id., should include
embracing a Brand X doctrine of avoidance.
191. RUBIN, supra note 22, at 6.
192. Id. at 35, 36 ("The advent of the administrative state, resulting from the articulation
of structure and purpose that reached their tipping points about two centuries ago, has
rendered the concepts we use to describe our government outdated .... In fact, the modem
administrative state, in its articulation and its instrumentalism, is the way we take collective
action to solve the enormous problems and achieve the even more enormous promises of
modem life. As we advance into this new millennium, we need to reconcile ourselves to its
existence, understand its underlying structure, and make it work.").
193. Id. at 43-48.
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concept of separation of powers between the branches particularly accurate
in light of the administrative state's overlap with all three branches. All
three branches have the power to supervise and give certain commands to
administrative agencies.
In place of the traditional "tree" metaphor, Dean Rubin proposes the
more modern metaphor of a network where each government entity is a
discrete unit within the network that has a defined role, operations,
interconnectivity, and an ability to receive and give commands to other
units:
The network metaphor does not imply that there can be no limitations on a
governmental unit's ability to issue assignments to other units. But those
limits must be specifically argued for, not derived from an outmoded, pre-
analytic image of government. One important limitation emerges from the
structure of the network itself, in that each unit is linked only to certain other
units. Thus, the network's design may provide that a given unit may only
issue assignments over certain pathways, and only to certain other units that
are generally designated as its subordinates. Indeed, the identity of an
individual or unit as the subordinate of another individual or unit generally
depends on the ability of the second unit to issue assignments to the first. 194
Dean Rubin also brackets the concepts of "power" and "discretion" and
replaces them with the concepts of "authorization" and "supervision."' 195
In other words, Congress, agencies, and courts do not have some inherent
power or discretion to perform certain actions; instead, they receive certain
authorization to act or supervise from other governmental units and sources
(including statutes and the Constitution itself). For instance, "the legislature
authorizes, or designs, administrative agencies, and each agency typically
authorizes a variety of subsidiary offices." 196 "When the legislature enacts a
statute enforced by an administrative agency, it is authorizing the agency to
act, but it can also be regarded as controlling the agency's
operations.... Supervision within the administrative apparatus involves
these same considerations."' 197 Such supervision must be assigned and
confined to that assignment.198
Network theory more precisely captures the expansive nature and role of
the modern administrative state than the traditional separate branches
metaphor. When network theory is substituted for the traditional branches
194. Id. at 63 (footnote omitted).
195. See id. at 91-94.
196. Id. at 93.
197. Id. at 105.
198. Similarly, Dean Rubin proposes that "the bracketed concept of law can be
replaced, in the administrative state, with the alternative concept of policy and
implementation." Id. at 203.
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metaphor, outdated generalities concerning the Judiciary's role are
similarly discarded-i.e., "that courts are the primary interpreters of
law."' 199 Indeed, under the network structure, "administrative agencies are
generally the primary interpreters of statutes in the modern state, and most
of these interpretations are never reviewed by the judiciary." 20 0  To
understand the agency's authority, one must identify the inputs. In
particular, Congress, under its Article I authority, authorizes the agency to
administer a particular statutory scheme, which includes a policymaking
role of filling the holes in the statute. Depending on the agency, it also may
have executive authority under Article II to execute and elaborate the law.
One must do the same to understand a court's scope of authority to
review agency action. Courts play a certain supervisory role over
administrative interpretations of law, but that role is confined to the
assignments given to them by other governmental units and sources, such
as Congress or the Constitution. From Congress, courts obtain supervisory
authority under the Administrative Procedure Act and often additional
review authority from the substantive statute the agency administers. From
the Constitution, courts have the duty and authority to ensure that an
agency acts within constitutional limits.
By focusing on the sources of authority instead of outdated notions of
separation of powers, the role of modern avoidance (or lack thereof) in the
review of administrative interpretations of law becomes clear. The
Constitution plainly does not authorize courts to invoke modern avoidance
to overturn an agency's otherwise permissible interpretation of a statute
Congress has authorized the agency to interpret. Nor has Congress
authorized courts to invoke such doctrine as part of their supervisory role.
To the contrary, Congress authorizes the agency to be the primary
interpreter of a statute it administers, and an executive agency also has
authority under Article II to execute the law in a manner it deems is
constitutional. If Congress were to determine that modern avoidance is
preferred in the administrative context, it could require the agency to
comply with the doctrine with respect to a particular statute, or it could
authorize the Judiciary to utilize modem avoidance as part of its
supervisory role over agency action. To date Congress has done neither.
20 1
199. Id. at 64.
200. Id.
201. Similarly, with respect to executive agencies, the President theoretically may also
have authority under Article II to require an agency to apply modern avoidance when it
construes statutes it administers.
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IV. APPLICATIONS
Part II explored the application of this Brand X doctrine in one
immigration context. But its application is not so limited. This Part briefly
provides a few additional examples and accompanying musings. As these
examples illustrate, this Brand X approach to constitutional avoidance has a
wide-reaching application to a variety of administrative contexts.
A. Immigration and National Security Law
In addition to the administrative interpretation discussed in Part II,
questions of constitutional avoidance abound in the immigration and
national security context. This may be due, in part, to the fact that there
are myriad undecided constitutional questions-or "phantom constitutional
norms"-that have arisen in light of the constitutionally unsettled nature of
the federal government's plenary power over immigration and national
security. 202 Consider another recent (and related) example.
Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Attorney General has
discretion to authorize continued detention "beyond the removal period" of
a noncitizen "who has been determined by the Attorney General to be a
risk to the community or unlikely to comply with the order of removal."
20 3
The Attorney General has promulgated regulations that require, among
other things, post-order custody reviews by agency officials within 90 days,
180 days, and 18 months of confinement; if continued detention is no
longer deemed necessary, the noncitizen is released on supervised
release. 2
04
When confronted with a challenge to these regulations in D/ouf v.
Napolitano, the Ninth Circuit invoked modern avoidance (erroneously at
Chevron step one205) and found that the regulations raise constitutional
doubts because they "do not provide for an in-person hearing, they place
the burden on the alien rather than the government and they do not
provide for a decision by a neutral arbiter such as an immigration judge."
20 6
202. See, e.g., Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom
Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE LJ. 545 (1990) (discussing how
invoking the plenary power doctrine without deciding whether it is indeed grounded in the
Constitution has created a number of subconstitutional or phantom constitutional norms in
immigration law).
203. 8U.S.C.§ 1231(a)(6)(2006).
204. See8 C.F.R. § 241.4(k)(2)(ii)-(iii) (2011).
205. 634 F.3d 1081, 1090 n.l 1 (9th Cir. 2011). For the reasons set forth in Part III.A,
the Ninth Circuit's holding that "the canon applies at Chevron step one, because it is 'a means
of giving effect to congressional intent,'" id. (quoting Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 382
(2005)), cannot be squared with the Court's decisions in Brand X and Clark.
206. Id. at 1091.
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"To address these concerns," the court ordered that "aliens who are denied
release in their 180-day reviews must be afforded the opportunity to
challenge their continued detention in a hearing before an immigration
judge."
207
The effect of the Ninth Circuit's application of modern avoidance is
plain: the court in essence amended the agency's regulations without
determining that there was an actual constitutional violation, much less
remanding to the agency to allow it to exercise its own expert judgment and
congressionally delegated discretion. Had the court applied the Brand X
doctrine of constitutional avoidance, it would have been forced to answer
the constitutional questions and thus accord proper deference to co-equal
branches of government.
B. National Labor Relations Law
A second apt example is the regulation the Court confronted in
DeBartolo.208 The issue in DeBartolo was whether to accord Chevron deference
to the National Labor Relations Board's construction of a provision in the
National Labor Relations Act that prohibits union strikers from engaging in
acts "to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce." 209
The Board had construed the provision "to cover handbilling at a mall
entrance urging potential customers not to trade with any retailers in the
mall, in order to exert pressure on the proprietor of the mall to influence a
particular mall tenant not to do business with a nonunion construction
contractor. "
2 10
As discussed in Part I.C, the Court did not decide whether the Board's
construction was constitutional and instead struck down the agency's
interpretation under modern constitutional avoidance. Indeed, the Court
strained to avoid providing an answer to the constitutional question:
207. Id. at 1092.
208. EdwardJ. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485
U.S. 568 (1988).
209. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii) (2006); see DeBartolo Corp., 485 U.S. at 574.
210. DeBartolo Corp., 485 U.S. at 574.
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Had the union simply been leafletting the public generally, including those
entering every shopping mall in town, pursuant to an annual educational
effort against substandard pay, there is little doubt that legislative
proscription of such leaflets would pose a substantial issue of validity under
the First Amendment. The same may well be true in this case, although here
the handbills called attention to a specific situation in the mall allegedly
involving the payment of unacceptably low wages by a construction
contractor.
That a labor union is the leafletter and that a labor dispute was involved
does not foreclose this analysis. We do not suggest that communications by
labor unions are never of the commercial speech variety and thereby entitled
to a lesser degree of constitutional protection.
211
Instead of providing a definitive answer on the constitutionality of the
Board's interpretation, the Court developed its own interpretation of the
statute. The Court held that its own interpretation "not reaching the
handbilling involved in this case is not foreclosed either by the language of
the section or its legislative history" and thus was an appropriate
substitution under modem avoidance.
2 12
The point need not be belabored, but it is difficult to square the Court's
substitution of its own interpretation in light of the deference rule set forth
in Chevron and reinforced in Brand X-even less so in light of the separation
of powers concerns raised by the Court's encroachment on the Board's
congressionally delegated law-elaboration authority.213  Had the Court
instead applied the classical version of avoidance, the Court may well have
upheld the Board's interpretation; or, more likely based on the Court's
reasoning, the Board (and Congress) would have been in the same position
as under modern avoidance except that the Board would have received a
definitive answer on the constitutional question and an opportunity to
adjust its interpretation accordingly. This case therefore further illustrates
the substantial costs and the absence of any real benefits of applying
modern avoidance under the Chevron framework.
211. Id. at 576.
212. Id. at 588.
213. One interesting wrinkle here is that the National Labor Relations Board is an
independent agency, see Wisconsin Public Service Corp. v. Federal Power Commission, 147 F.2d 743,
748 (7th Cir. 1945), and thus the constitutional separation of powers concerns may not be
quite as compelling as in the case of an agency controlled by the President. See Kagan, supra
note 37, at 2373-74 (arguing that agencies controlled by the President should receive greater




The same can be said of the question implicated in Solid Waste Ageny.
214
At issue there was the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers's interpretation of
§ 404(a) of the Clean Water Act, which regulates the discharge of dredged
or fill material into navigable waters. 2 15  The Corps had interpreted
"navigable waters" to cover abandoned sand and gravel pits which provide
habitat for migratory birds.2 16 The Court held that the government did not
have jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act to regulate isolated ponds and
mudflats. Notwithstanding this ruling at Chevron step one, the Court also
held that the Corps's interpretation was owed no Chevron deference because
it raised serious constitutional questions under the Commerce Clause.
2 1 7
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, dissented.
While not opining explicitly on the Court's invocation of modern
constitutional avoidance,Justice Stevens called the Court's refusal to accord
Chevron deference "unfaithful" and argued that the Corps's interpretation
was fully consistent with the Commerce Clause.2 18 Justice Stevens's dissent
makes the Court's gratuitous invocation of modern avoidance all the more
puzzling.
But Solid Waste Agency was not the end of this story. Five years later the
Corps's (arguably unchanged) interpretation of naviable waters returned to
the Court in Rapanos v. United States.219 The Court again rejected the
Corps's interpretation, yet could not find five votes for an interpretation of
its own. The four-Justice plurality argued that the Clean Water Act only
covered permanent bodies of water with a continuous connection to waters
of the United States. 220  Justice Kennedy advocated a case-by-case
assessment of whether a particular wetland has a "significant nexus" to
traditional navigable waters.221  Justice Kennedy's position-which
garnered only his vote-controlled because it was the narrowest
interpretation. 222
Yet, Professor Metzger has argued that the agency-exercising its
214. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159
(2001).
215. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2006); Solid WasteAgenqy, 531 U.S. at 162.
216. Solid WasteAgency, 531 U.S. at 162.
217. Id. at 174.
218. Id. at 191, 196-97 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
219. 547 U.S. 715 (2006).
220. Id. at 742.
221. Id. at 782 (KennedyJ., concurring).
222. See, e.g., United States v. Robison, 505 F.3d 1208, 1221 (1 1th Cir. 2007) ("For the
reasons stated below, we join the Seventh and the Ninth Circuits' conclusion that Justice
Kennedy's 'significant nexus' test provides the governing rule of Rapanos.").
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expertise and facing political accountability not encountered by the
Court-may have chosen other available approaches, "such as exempting
any wetlands and tributaries not clearly navigable waters in their own right,
or creating a rebuttable presumption that wetlands adjacent to navigable
waters or their tributaries are subject to regulation. '" 223 Indeed, in light of
the Brand X doctrine of constitutional avoidance, the agency may yet be
able to write another chapter in this story by advancing a new, less
sweeping interpretation.
Chief Justice Roberts's concurring opinion in Rapanos also merits
mention. The Chief Justice lamented that the Corps did not refine its
"essentially boundless view of the scope of its power" in light of Solid Waste
Agency and thus did not "provid[e] guidance meriting deference under our
generous standards." 224 He further explained that "[g]iven the broad,
somewhat ambiguous, but nonetheless clearly limiting terms Congress
employed in the Clean Water Act, the Corps and the Environmental
Protection Agency would have enjoyed plenty of room to operate in
developing some notion of an outer bound to the reach of their authority."
225
These points are well taken. But perhaps the agency would have had more
guidance from Solid Waste Agency had the Court there applied the classical
canon of avoidance-and answered the constitutional question(s)-instead
of applying the modern canon that dodged them.
D. Federal Election Law
Federal election law is another context in which modern avoidance has
played a critical role, as Congress has delegated broad authority to the
Federal Election Commission (FEC) to interpret federal election law. For
instance, in Chamber of Commerce v. FEC,226 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit was asked to evaluate the FEC's interpretation of "member"
as used (but not defined) in the Federal Election Campaign Act. The FEC's
interpretation "in effect limit[ed] 'members'-to whom a membership
organization can convey political messages and solicitations-to individuals
having the right to vote, directly or indirectly, for at least one member of
the organization's highest governing body." 227 The D.C. Circuit noted that
"the Supreme Court quite clearly recognized, by not attempting an
'exegesis,' that the word [member] has a range of possible meanings," but
held that the FEC was owed no Chevron deference because "the
223. Metzger, supra note 120, at 533.
224. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 758 (Roberts, CJ., concurring).
225. Id.
226. 69 F.3d 600 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
227. Id. at 601; see also 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(B)(iii) (2006); 11 C.F.R. § 114.1(e)(2) (2011).
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interpretation the Commission has codified presents serious constitutional
difficulties." 228 Indeed, the court appeared to extend modern avoidance as
an obligation "to construe the statute to avoid constitutional difficulties if
such a construction is not plainly contrary to the intent of Congress."
229
Interestingly, the following year, when faced with a challenge to an FEC
interpretation of a different statute, the D.C. Circuit refused to apply
modern avoidance to trump Chevron deference because the court decided it
could "easily resolve the [petitioners'] First Amendment challenges through
the application of controlling precedent." 230 In light of this dichotomy, it
may be fruitful to take a closer look at courts' decisions to invoke modern
avoidance to determine in what instances they invoke it because they
believe the agency's interpretation is actually unconstitutional and when
they invoke it because there is reasonable doubt without such certainty.
Such an inquiry is reminiscent of Professor Karl Llewellyn's eminent legal
realist argument that interpretive canons often may be used to justify
reasoning by other means.
231
E. Federal Communications Law
A final example comes from federal communications law. Under the
Public Telecommunications Act, broadcasters face an indecency ban that
proscribes against "utter[ing] any obscene, indecent, or profane language
by means of radio communication," which Congress has instructed the
FCC to enforce between 6 a.m. and 10 p.m. 232 This statutory prohibition
has prompted a number of Supreme Court decisions-the most recent of
228. Chamber of Commerce, 69 F.3d at 604-05.
229. Id. at 605.
230. Republican Nat'l Comm. v. FEC, 76 F.3d 400, 409 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
231. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theoy of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons
About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950); see alsoJonathan R. Macey
& Geoffrey P. Miller, The Canons of Statutory Construction and judicial Preferences, 45 VAND. L.
REV. 647, 648 (1992) (responding to Llewellyn and advancing a theory useful "in predicting
when a judge will use a canon to decide a particular case, and when she will decline to
invoke a canon, and choose instead to decide the case on some other grounds"). Seegeneraly
John. F. Manning, Legal Realism & the Canons' Revival, 5 GREEN BAG 2D 283, 295 (2002) ("For
many years, the force of Liewellyn's essay and the triumph of strong post-war intentionalism
and purposivism made it possible for such questions [concerning the usefulness of normative
canons] to be neglected. With the return of realist skepticism about legislative intent and
purpose, questions about the consistency, rationality, and legitimacy of the canons can no
longer be ignored.").
232. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2006); Public Telecommunications Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-356, § 16(a), 106 Stat. 949, 954 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 303 note (2006) (Broadcasting of
Indecent Programming; Federal Communications Commission (FCC) Regulations)).
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which is FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. 233
In Fox, the Court, withJustice Scalia writing for a 5-4 majority, held that
it was neither arbitrary nor capricious for the FCC to change its position
and interpret the statutory indecency prohibition to cover the utterance of
patently offensive words or phrases even if they are not sustained or
repeated during the broadcast. 234 In reaching this conclusion, Justice Scalia
rejected the application of the modem doctrine of constitutional avoidance
to
limit the scope of authorized executive action. In the same section
authorizing courts to set aside "arbitrary [or] capricious" agency action, the
Administrative Procedure Act separately provides for setting aside agency
action that is "unlawful," which of course includes unconstitutional action.
We think that is the only context in which constitutionality bears upon
judicial review of authorized agency action.
235
In other words, only the classical form of avoidance applies to authorized
executive action. To be sure, Justice Scalia observed, in an accompanying
footnote, that the Court had previously applied modern avoidance to
statutory questions under Chevron. 236 But that does not mean the Court
should continue to do so-especially in light of Brand X and Norwegian Cruise
Line.2
37
233. 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009).
234. Id. at 1812, 1819.
235. Id. at 1812 (alteration in original) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006)).
236. Id. at 1812 n.3. This discussion of constitutional avoidance was in response to
Justice Breyer's suggestion in dissent that the Court should remand the matter to the agency
and "ask the agency to reconsider its policy decision in light of the concerns raised in a
judicial opinion." Id. at 1840 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia responded that such a
"strange and novel disposition would be entirely unrelated to the doctrine of constitutional
avoidance, and would better be termed the doctrine of judicial arm-twisting or appellate
review by the wagged uinger." Id. at 1812 n.3 (majority opinion); see also Metzger, supra note
120, at 484 (discussing further this exchange in Fox).
237. While not invoking modern avoidance, the Court nevertheless avoided the
constitutional question whether the FCC's orders and regulations interpreting the statute are
constitutional. Justice Thomas, in his concurring opinion, argued that it may be time for the
Court to revisit its precedents underlying the FCC's interpretation of the obscenity
prohibition. See Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. at 1819-22 (Thomas, J., concurring)
(questioning FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978), and Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969)). The Second Circuit had not reached the constitutionality of the
FCC's interpretation, so the Court declined to address the constitutional questions raised by
the parties. The Court noted that "whether it is unconstitutional, will be determined soon
enough, perhaps in this very case." Id. at 1819 (majority opinion). Indeed, the Second
Circuit, on remand, confronted the constitutional issue directly and held that "the FCC's
policy violates the First Amendment because it is unconstitutionally vague, creating a
chilling effect that goes far beyond the fleeting expletives at issue here." Fox Television




This Article has demonstrated why the modern doctrine of constitutional
avoidance should never have been applied in the administrative context
where a court is charged "to accept the agency's [reasonable] construction
of the statute, even if the agency's reading differs from what the court
believes is the best statutory interpretation."' 238 The reasons are twofold:
First, there are the practical considerations that, while courts are well
equipped to decide whether an interpretation is actually constitutional,
agencies are often better equipped to address the constitutional questions in
the ambiguous statutes they administer by filling the holes with procedural
safeguards and substantive criteria. Second, when a court displaces an
agency's preferred (and constitutional) interpretation of a statute it
administers with one the court believes better avoids constitutional
questions, the court violates separation of powers-under both Article I
and Article II. Yet courts, including the Supreme Court, have on occasion
applied modern avoidance to trump Chevron. Brand X and its progeny
should be viewed as providing an opportunity for courts to correct course.
Accordingly, at least in the administrative context, courts should discard
the use of the modern form of constitutional avoidance and, in essence,
return to the classical form. If an agency has exercised its discretion to
provide an otherwise reasonable interpretation that raises constitutional
questions, a court must determine whether that interpretation is indeed
unconstitutional and thus impermissible under Chevron step two. Otherwise,
Congress's delegation of authority-as well as the Executive's fulfillment of
its constitutional duty to execute the law-should be accorded proper
deference. This is not only the more prudent course of action, but also the
constitutional one.
The Supreme Court has granted certiorari and will have the last word on this issue.
238. Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980
(2005) (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44
& n.l (1984)).
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